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Tu: Perfecting Bitcoin

PERFECTING BITCOIN
Kevin V. Tu*
Bitcoin is still here. The price of Bitcoin reboundedsetting a record high of $19,783.21 per Bitcoin in
December 2017 before dropping to a price of $8,690 per
Bitcoin as of March 22, 2018. Moreover, legal and
regulatory developments, like New York's BitLicense and
federal taxation of virtual currency as property, can be
viewed as legitimizing its use. The normalization of
virtual currency is evidenced by its increasingly
mainstream applications. Virtual currency can be used
as a faster and lower cost method of transferringfunds
domestically and internationally. A growing number of
retailers now accept virtual currency as a method of
payment. In addition, more and more investors are
trying to capitalize on the price volatility of virtual
currency by buying and selling it as a speculative
investment. Recognizing the potential of this growing
market of users, investment in virtual currency
businesses and startupshas also risen. Even traditional
financial institutions and the New York Stock Exchange
have invested-participating in a funding round for
Coinbase that raised $75 million dollars.
Putting aside the normative question of whether the
normalization of virtual currency is desirable, an
inescapable truth remains. Virtual currency is a
present reality. It has the potential to disrupt a range
of traditionalindustries and implicate a host of legal
issues. But to date, the legal and regulatory treatment
of virtual currency has been limited. Developments in
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virtual currency law have focused almost exclusively on
virtual currency in the context of money transmission
and the twin regulatory objectives of crime prevention
and consumer protection.
Outside of this space, the discussion about and
implementation of an appropriate legal framework is
relatively undeveloped. Secured transactions are a
prime example of a significant commercial practice that
is currently being affected by virtual currencyspecifically, the use of virtual currency as collateral. It
is increasingly likely that debtors, both individuals and
organizational,will hold virtual currency. Because of
this, creditors must now deal with the realities of
ensuring that they have attached, perfected and have
priority over a debtor's virtual currency. If creditors
are unable to navigate this process, they risk losing out
on the monetary value of the virtual currency upon a
Uniform
Unfortunately, the
debtor default.
virtual
not
drafted
with
Commercial Code was
currency in mind and it has not been optimized in any
Therefore, those
way to expressly account for it.
engaged in secured transactions are in the position of
having to evaluate and interpret how the existing
provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code might
apply to virtual currency.
This Article expands the conversation by pushing
beyond the confines of current developments in virtual
currency law and regulation. In doing so, it considers
broader commercial law implications of virtual
currency. Specifically, this Article provides a solution
for the present and future of virtual currency collateral
under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. This
Article sets forth a roadmap for dealing with the
uncertainties of virtual currency collateral under
Article 9 as it exists today. In addition, it advances a
framework for optimizing Article 9 for virtual currency
collateral by recognizing it as a distinct collateral type
and creating special rules based on the concept of
"control" which already applies to other collateral
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types. Since U.S. policymakers have already opted to
accommodate (rather than ban) virtual currency, this
Article seeks to ensure that the discussion does not
overlook the commercial law implications of virtual
currency. In doing so, this Article highlights the
importance of and advances the development of a
comprehensive and appropriately-scaled set of laws
and regulations applicable to virtual currency in the
United States.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Bitcoin is described as a decentralized cryptocurrency. 1 Since
the first Bitcoin transaction in 2009,2 it has transcended obscurity
and penetrated the public consciousness. Pop culture mentions of
Bitcoin include cameos in the movie Horrible Bosses 23 and an
episode of The Simpsons,4 along with tweets by Snoop Dogg and
Ashton Kutcher. 5 Though Bitcoin has frequently been associated
1 Bitcoin is not backed by a commodity, government, or central bank. Units of the currency
are denominated in Bitcoins (not U.S. dollars or any other form of legal tender). The value of
Bitcoin, then, is primarily a function of what value people assign to it on the open market and
in exchange for goods, services, or fiat currency. But what makes Bitcoin truly unique is that
there is no central authority charged with creating units of Bitcoin or verifying Bitcoin
transactions. Units of Bitcoin are created by a process called "mining" whereby computer
enthusiasts use the processing power of their computers to solve complex math problems and
authenticate Bitcoin transactions. Until the pre-determined cap of 21 million Bitcoins is
reached, those who engage in mining are rewarded with newly created Bitcoins, which only
exist digitally. Because Bitcoin transactions are verified though the use of cryptography and
the process of mining, the need for traditional third-party intermediaries like Visa or
MasterCard is eliminated. Bitcoin transactions occur via the use of two keys-each user has
one public key that is shared with the world and one private key that is kept secret like a
password. To send Bitcoin, a transaction is initiated with the amount of the transfer encoded
with the recipient's public key. The recipient then accepts the transfer by entering the same
amount encoded with his or her private key. Finally, the sender acknowledges the transfer by
Once the transaction is
signing the transaction with his or her private key.
authorized/verified, it is recorded on a public ledger known as the "blockchain." Bitcoin,
therefore, has several perceived benefits. For example, the price of Bitcoin is insulated against
inflation and government manipulations because it is created at a controlled pace.
Transactions are both faster and cheaper because there is no intermediary involved. In
addition, Bitcoin transactions do not contain personally identifiable information, which may
provide greater security and protection from identity theft.
2 See Benjamin Wallace, The Rise and Fall of Bitcoin, WIRED (Nov. 23, 2011, 2:52 PM),
http://www.wired.com/magazine/2011/11/mf-bitcoin/ ("Nakamoto himself mined the first 50
bitcoins-which came to be called the genesis block--on January 3, 2009.').
3 See Josiah Wilmoth, Horrible Bosses 2 Features Bitcoin Cameo, CRYPTOCOINS NEWS
(Nov. 28, 2014), https://www.cryptocoinsnews.com/horrible-bosses-2-features-bitcoin-cameo/
(describing how Jamie Foxx's character in Horrible Bosses 2 uses the black market to buy
prepaid cell phones with Bitcoin).
4 See Clay Michael Gillespie, Bitcoin Meets The Simpsons/Family Guy Crossover,
CRYPTocoiNS NEWS (Nov. 30, 2014), https://www.cryptocoinsnews.comlbitcoin-meets-simps
ons-family-guy-crossover/ (discussing a billboard advertisement about Bitcoin that briefly
appeared in The Simpsons and Family Guy crossover episode).
5 See Paul Vigna, Snoop Dogg Isn't Selling Albums via Bitcoin (But Scary Spice Is),
WALL ST. J.: MONEYBEAT (Dec. 13, 2013, 12:58 PM), http://blogs.wsj.comlmoneybeat/2013/1
2/13/snoop-dogg-isnt-selling-albums-via-bitcoin-but-scary-spice-is/ (discussing a tweet by
Snoop Dogg in which he falsely claimed that his new album would be available for purchase
with Bitcoin); Eric Blair, Bitcoin PenetratesPop Culture: Snoop, Ashton and The Simpsons,
ACTIVIST POST (Dec. 9, 2013), http://www.activistpost.com/2013/12/bitcoin-penetrates-pop-

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol52/iss2/4

6

Tu: Perfecting Bitcoin

2018]

PERFECTINGBITCOIN

with unsavory characters and criminal activity, 6 supporters
contend that it has unique attributes, which hold promise for
7
legitimate mainstream applications.
As an alternative to money or traditional payment systems,
Bitcoin is less costly because it does not rely on traditional thirdparty payment processors who charge expensive transaction fees.8
Bitcoin payments and transfers are also faster because the use of
cryptography eliminates the need for verification of available
funds by a bank. 9
Finally, the irreversibility of Bitcoin
transactions protects merchants against disputed or fraudulent
chargebacks. 10
The benefits of Bitcoin as a legitimate method of payment are not
purely theoretical. An increasing number of merchants, including
established brands like Microsoft,1 1 Dell, 12 Overstock.com,1 3
Expedia, 14 and the Sacramento Kings basketball team, 15 now accept
Bitcoin.1 6 Outside of consumer payments, the lower cost and
increased speed of transfers may even provide an alternative to

culture-snoop.html (discussing tweets by Snoop Dogg and Ashton Kutcher that mention
Bitcoin).
6 See JERRY BRITO & ANDREA CASTILLO, BITcoIn: A PRIMER FOR POLICYMAKERS 22-23, 37
(2d ed. 2013), https:/Hmercatus.org/sites/default/files/Brito_BitcoinPrimer_vl.3.pdf (discussing
how Bitcoin has been used by criminals for purposes such as fraud, gambling, and the sale of
illegal products and illicit drugs).
See Kevin V. Tu & Michael W. Meredith, Rethinking Virtual Currency Regulation in
the Bitcoin Age, 90 WASH. L. REV. 271, 296 (2015).
8 See BRITO & CASTILLO, supra note 6, at 14.
9 See id. at 7.
10 See id. at 15.

11 See Aaron Smith, Microsoft Begins Accepting Bitcoin, CNN MONEY (Dec. 11, 2014, 1:02
PM), http://money.cnn.com/2014/12/1 1/technology/microsoft-bitcoin/index.html.
12 See Sydney Temper, Dell Begins Accepting Bitcoin, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (July 18,
2014, 3:34 PM), https://nytimes/2aVX2kl.
13 See Cade Metz, Overstock.com Becomes First Major Retailer to Accept Bitcoin
Worldwide, WIRED (Sept. 11, 2014, 9:20 AM), https://www.wired.com/2014/09/overstock-co
m-becomes-first-major-retailer-accept-bitcoin-worldwide/.
14 See Jane Genova, Expedia Accepts Bitcoin-Why?, PAYMENT WEEK (June 18, 2014),
http://paymentweek.com/2014-6-18-expedia-accepts-bitcoin-why-4923/.
15 See Michael J. Casey, Sacramento Kings to Accept Bitcoin, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 16, 2014,
10:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/Sacramento-nba-team-to-accept-bicoin-1389884367.
16 See Jacob Davidson, No, Big Companies Aren't Really Accepting Bitcoin, TIME (Jan. 9,
2015), http://time.com/money/3658361/dell-microsoft-expedia-bitcoin/ (noting that major
brands are starting to allow their customers to pay with Bitcoin).
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traditional money transfer services like Western Union for the
17
unbanked or underbanked.
As an investment, Bitcoin also provides the potential for a
positive return and a means of diversifying an investment
portfolio.1 8 The historic price volatility of Bitcoin creates the
potential for both significant gains and losses, which makes it ripe
for speculative investment. 19 Moreover, because Bitcoins are
created at20 a fixed pace via a computer program and the process of
"mining," proponents contend that Bitcoin, unlike traditional
currencies, is less susceptible to inflation and artificial government
manipulation of value. 21 This makes it potentially useful as a part
of a diversified investment portfolio.
In the face of these growing mainstream uses, policymakers in
the United States have been open to continued virtual currency
use and innovation. 22 Rather than ban virtual currency, they have
opted to regulate it. Accordingly, this Article accepts that the
approach to virtual currency in the United States is presently one
of accommodation and regulation. Therefore, this Article does not
take a position on the normative question of whether legitimizing
virtual currency is the correct path forward. Instead, it aims to
tackle challenges presented by: (1) the decision to regulate virtual
currency, and (2) the resulting legal and regulatory environment.

17

Imagine an immigrant that works in one country who wishes to send money to family

members in a rural area of another country. Instead of relying on complex correspondent
banking relationships or requiring that the family member travel long distances to a financial
institution, the transaction can be accomplished electronically using smartphones. See Steve
Forbes, How Bitcoin Will End World Poverty, FORBES (Apr. 2, 2015, 4:51 PM), https:lwww.
forbes.com/sites/steveforbes/2015/04/O2/how-bitcoin-will-end-world-poverty/
(reporting
an
interview with William Blair partner Brian Singer, in which he argues that Bitcoin has the
potential to lift the world's poor out of poverty).
18 See Tu & Meredith, supra note 7, at 273-74 ('The fluctuation in value of Bitcoin over
time has led many to view it more as a commodity, asset class, or security ripe for
speculative investment ....Despite its volatility, investors have engaged in buying, selling,
and trading of Bitcoin in an attempt to achieve a return on investment.").
19 See id. at 292.
20 See BRrro & CASTILLO, supra note 6, at 7-9.
21 See Tu & Meredith, supra note 7, at 282-84.
22 See, e.g., The Disrupter Series: Digital Currency and Blockchain Technology: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Com., Mfg., & Trade of the H. Comm. on Energy and Com., 114th
Cong. (2016) [hereinafter House Subcommittee Hearing];Beyond Silk Road: Potential Risks,
Threats and Promises of Virtual Currencies:HearingBefore the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec.
& Governmental Affs., 113th Cong. (2013) [hereinafter Senate Committee Hearing].
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Bitcoin initially operated without oversight. 23 Given time,
however, the legal and regulatory framework in the United States
has started to catch up. Considerable progress has been made in a
relatively short period of time. Developments in the evolving
landscape of virtual currency law include clarification of its
treatment under the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA),24 state money
27
transmitter laws, 25 federal securities laws, 26 and federal tax laws.
States have also begun to debate and enact new licensing
requirements for virtual currency businesses. 28
These
developments represent an important first step in the
establishment of a comprehensive and appropriately scaled set of
laws and regulations applicable to virtual currency.
Looking at these developments collectively, however, highlights
their relatively narrow focus. The BSA, state money transmitter
laws, and new licensing requirements build on the existing
regulatory framework for businesses that transmit money on
behalf of one person to another person or location and impose
regulatory compliance requirements on those that transfer virtual
28 See Tu & Meredith, supra note 7, at 296 (stating that during its infancy, "Bitcoin
largely operated free from regulatory scrutiny); see also EUR. CENT. BANK, VIRTUAL
CURRENCY SCHEMES 5 (2012), http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/virtualcurrencysche

mes201210en.pdf (describing virtual currency as "unregulated); Gregory Ferenstein,
Senator Warns Unregulated Bitcoin Leaves Americans Holding a "Valueless Currency,"
TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 27, 2014), https://techcrunch.com/2014/02/27/senator-warns-unregulate
d-bitcoin-leaves-americans-holding-a-valueless-currency/ (discussing the need for strict
regulation of virtual currency).
24

See U.S.

DEP'T OF THE TREASURY FIN. CRIMES ENF'T NETWORK,

FIN-2013-G001,

APPLICATION OF FINCEN'S REGULATIONS TO PERSONS ADMINISTERING, EXCHANGING, OR USING

VIRTUAL CURRENCIES (2013) [hereinafter FIN-2013-GO01].
25 See, e.g., KAN. OFFICE OF THE STATE BANK COMM'R, REGULATORY TREATMENT OF VIRTUAL
CURRENCIES UNDER THE KANSAS MONEY TRANSMITTER ACT MT 2014-01 (2014), http://www.

osbckansas.orgmt/guidance/mt2014 01 virtualcurrency.pdf;

TEX.

DEP'T

OF

BANKING,

REGULATORY TREATMENT OF VIRTUAL CURRENCIES UNDER THE TEXAS MONEY SERVICES ACT

1037 (2014), http://www.dob.texas.gov/public/uploads/files/consumer-informationsm1037.pdf;
WASH. STATE DEP'T OF FIN. INSTS., INTERIM REGULATORY GUIDANCE ON VIRTUAL CURRENCY

ACTIVITES (2014), http://www.dfi.wa.gov/documents/money-transmitters/virtual-currency-int
erim-guidance.pdf.
26 See SEC v. Shavers, No. 4:13-cv-416, 2013 WL 4028182, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2013)
(holding that Bitcoin investments are securities under federal securities law).
27 See I.R.S. Notice 2014-21, 2014-16 I.R.B. 938 (Apr. 14, 2014) [hereinafter I.R.S. Notice
2014-21].
28 See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, ch. I, pt. 200 (2017) [hereinafter N.Y.
VIRTUAL CURRENCY REGS.]; N.Y. STATE DEP'T OF FIN. SERVS., ORDER PURSUANT TO N.Y.

BANKING LAW §§ 2-B, 24, 32, 102-A, AND 4001-B AND FINANCIAL SERVICES LAw §§ 301(c)
AND 302(A) [hereafter N.Y. ORDER], http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/ea/eal40311.pdf.
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currency. 29 The clarification of federal securities laws, however,
30
has focused on virtual currency related investments schemes.
Thus, the efforts to clarify existing law and to enact new law have
idled on the most publicized uses of virtual currency: either as an
alternative to money in the context of money transmission or as a
The current legal and regulatory
speculative investment. 3 1
environment for virtual currency, therefore, primarily addresses
the risks associated with these activities: (1) detecting and
preventing money laundering, terrorist financing, and other
criminal activity; (2) protecting consumers from 32suffering losses;
and (3) protecting the investing public from harm.
The impact of virtual currency, however, is not confined to these
uses and risks. Other legitimate applications of virtual currency
may involve a degree of uncertainty because existing legal
constructs often fail to clearly and explicitly accommodate virtual
currency. This can create real challenges for those who must
navigate uncertain legal requirements and processes that were not
designed with virtual currency in mind, especially when there is
an absence of guidance on how to do so.
Secured transactions under Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC) may be the most important area of law
currently impacted by both the use of virtual currency and an
underdeveloped discussion about its legal implications. 33 Secured
transactions play a central role in the United States economyreducing the cost of lending, which increases the availability of
credit and stimulates economic growth. By enabling creditors to
obtain a security interest in the assets of a debtor as collateral,
creditors gain enhanced rights, including the right to foreclose on
the collateral. 34 This provides greater assurances of having a
viable means of obtaining legal relief and ultimately payment.
Article 9 governs security interests in most types of tangible
and intangible personal property. Even though virtual currency is
a type of personal property, Article 9 does not expressly mention
29

See infra Part II.B.1.

30 See infra Part II.B.1.b.
31
32
33

See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part IV.

34 See U.C.C. §§ 9-601, 9-610 (AM. LAW INST. & NATL CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF.
STATE LAWS 2017).
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it.3 5

This should come as no surprise because Article 9 preceded its
Article 9's silence is problematic, however, because
creditors must struggle with determining how virtual currency fits
into the existing framework. This is further complicated by the
fact that successfully navigating Article 9 often depends on
correctly categorizing collateral. Article 9 provides a detailed
process for attaching enforceable security interests and perfecting
those security interests to establish priority among conflicting
security interests in the same collateral. 37 But the available
methods for attachment and perfection differ depending on
collateral type.38 Creditors must, therefore, fit virtual currency
into a collateral type that already exists. Only then can creditors
determine the available methods for attaching and perfecting an
enforceable security interest.
This affords creditors with a serviceable, but potentially suboptimal, framework for dealing with virtual currency collateral.
The need to fit virtual currency into an existing collateral type
increases the potential risk of failing to attach and perfect because
creditors may mistakenly categorize virtual currency and use an
unauthorized method of attaching or perfecting.
In addition,
because creditors must apply rules developed for a different
collateral type, the process may not account for all of the unique
attributes of virtual currency. Even so, Article 9's treatment of
virtual currency is now an inescapable reality for all who are
currently engaged in secured transactions.
Many individuals and businesses now hold virtual currency.
Due to its monetary value (which has risen from around $1,000
per Bitcoin in January 2017 to a high of $19,783.21 per Bitcoin in
December 2017),39 some creditors may make an affirmative
decision to take a security interest in a debtor's virtual currency as
the only collateral or, more likely, as a part of a larger package of
rise. 36

35 For example, the definitions section of Article 9 includes no definition of "virtual
currency" or similar terms. U.C.C. § 9-102.
36 Article 9 was substantially revised in 1998 and last amended in 2010.
3 See infra Part IV.
38 See infra Part IV.
39 See Bitcoin (USD) Price, COINDESK, https://www.coindesk.com/price/ (last visited Mar.
22, 2018); see also Stan Higgins, From $900 to $20,000: Bitcoin's Historic 2017 Price Run
Revisited, COINDESK (Dec. 29, 2017, 1:30 AM), https://www.coindesk.com/900-20000-bitcoinshistoric-2017-price-run-revisited/.
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Even if a debtor does not currently hold virtual
collateral.
currency, creditors may wish to include it within the grant of a
security interest because Article 9 allows for security interests in
after-acquired collateral. 40 As discussed, those who want to attach
and perfect a security interest in virtual currency must abide by
Article 9 despite the uncertainty.
Even those creditors that do not make an affirmative decision to
take a security interest in virtual currency must deal with its
impact. Many creditors have a practice of taking a blanket
41 This reduces the
security interest in all the assets of a debtor.
risk of having insufficient collateral value in the event of debtor
default. 42 By taking a blanket security interest, however, creditors
may unknowingly involve virtual currency; therefore, Article 9's
treatment of virtual currency is important to all creditors who
want to understand the scope of their collateral and ensure that
they have priority in the event of a default.
In addition, creditors may be interested in having a security
interest over more traditional assets that a debtor acquires
through the use of virtual currency. Imagine a debtor who owns
virtual currency and uses some of it to purchase a car. This
transaction is governed by Article 9's rules regarding "proceeds"generally defined as "whatever is acquired upon the sale, lease,
43 Therefore,
license, exchange, or other disposition of collateral."
Article 9's treatment of virtual currency is also relevant to
creditors who wish to ensure their rights to the proceeds of virtual
currency collateral.
This Article tackles the practical problems that arise from a
combination of: (1) a legal framework for secured transactions that
is silent on virtual currency, and (2) the fact that policymakers
have yet to cogitate about the costs and benefits for optimizing

40

See U.C.C. § 9-204 (AM. LAw INST. & NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE

LAWS 2017).
41 See, e.g., Barbara M. Goodstein, Collateral Descriptions and Blanket Liens: Is the
Kitchen Sink Enough?, N.Y. L.J. (June 4, 2015), http://at.law.com/7YekpJ ('Blanket or 'all
assets' security interests are among the most common, if not the most common, type of lien
required of borrowers by secured lenders in commercial transactions.').
42 See William C. Whitford, The Appropriate Role of Security Interest in Consumer
Transactions,7 CARDOZO L. REV. 959, 986 (1986) (explaining that blanket security interests
work by expanding the collateral value that a creditor may repossess in the event of default).
43 U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(64)(A).
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Article 9 for virtual currency. Specifically, I make three principal
contributions with this Article.
First, I expand the conversation by addressing commercial law
implications of virtual currency.
In doing so, I encourage
deliberation of a broader range of legal issues raised by virtual
currency use. I note that the United States is already pursuing a
policy of acceptance and regulation when it comes to virtual
currency. If the United States is intent on developing a legal and
regulatory framework for virtual currency, it must consider all
(not just some) uses of virtual currency. Accordingly, as new
applications of virtual currency emerge, efforts to develop the law
should also expand. The development of a comprehensive and
coherent set of laws applicable to virtual currency depends on
taking this next step.
Second, I provide practical guidance on how to obtain an
enforceable security interest in virtual currency and evaluate
priority under the existing provisions of Article 9. I conclude that
Article 9 is flexible enough to cover security interests in virtual
currency collateral by categorizing it as a "general intangible" and
suggest best practices for mitigating potential risks.
Third, I develop a framework that can be used (in the future) to
optimize Article 9 for virtual currency collateral. I suggest that
Article 9 should define virtual currency as a separate collateral type
and extend the concept of control, which already applies to certain
intangible collateral, to virtual currency collateral. This would
allow for the creation of a set of special rules tailored to virtual
currency that is consistent with the existing provisions of Article 9
and familiar to those who are engaged in secured transactions.
This Article proceeds in four parts.
Part II provides an
overview of the current legal environment and shows how
economic factors and public perception have shaped the substance
of virtual currency law in the United States. Part III examines
how new uses and applications may implicate legal issues beyond
the limited scope of current developments in virtual currency
law-specifically the disruptive potential of virtual currency in
secured transactions. Part IV provides best practices for dealing
with the uncertainty of virtual currency collateral under the
existing provisions of Article 9. Part V establishes a framework for
optimizing Article 9 so that it provides a more effective and
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efficient process of obtaining an enforceable security interest in
virtual currency. The Article will then briefly conclude.
II. THE U.S. RESPONSE TO BITCOIN

Unlike countries that have opted to ban virtual currencies like
Bitcoin, 44 policymakers in the United States have shown a
willingness to embrace it-subject to proper regulation. 45 In this
Part, I start by orienting readers to the economic realities and
events that appear to be driving the proliferation of Bitcoin
regulation in the United States. I suggest that the speed and
substance of regulatory developments have been influenced in
large part by: (1) growing mainstream adoption of Bitcoin as an
alternative to money; (2) the value of Bitcoin; and (3) several highprofile incidents that have highlighted the potential risks of
Bitcoin. I also provide an overview of the developing legal and
regulatory framework. To date, Bitcoin regulation appears to be
fairly limited in scope-primarily regulating risks relating to the

4 See Tu & Meredith, supra note 7, at 302-03 (providing a list of countries that have
opted to ban or severely limit the use of virtual currencies, including Thailand, China, and
Iceland); see also Matthew Braga, As Merchants Embrace Bitcoin, Digital Currency Still
Struggles for Regulatory Approval Worldwide, FIN. POST (Jan. 20, 2014, 2:04 PM), http://
2 14
(reporting
business.financialpost.com/technology/bitcoin-currency-merchants-regulators- 0
Hill, Bitcoin in
Kashmir
that Finland, Canada, and Norway all reject Bitcoin as legal tender);
Chinca The Fall-out From Chinese Government Banning Real World Use, FORBES (Dec. 6,
2013, 2:24 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2013/12/O6/bitcoin-in-china-the-fa
(reporting that China's ban on
1-out-from-chinese-government-banning-real-world-use/
Bitcoin in 2013 caused -thevirtual currency's value to drop from a high of around $1,200 to
around $800); Anita Ramasastry, Bitcoin: If You Can't Ban It, Should You Regulate It? The
Merits of Legalization, JUSTIA.COM: VERDICT (Feb. 25, 2014), http://j.stZkzz (reporting that
Germany does not consider Bitcoin to be legal tender, China has banned Bitcoin altogether,
and Russia is attempting to ban its use). See generally GLOBAL LEGAL RESEARCH
DIRECTORATE STAFF, REGULATION OF BITCOIN IN SELECTED JURISDICTIONS (2014), http://
www.loc.gov/law/help/bicoin-survey/regulation-of-bitcoirpdf (surveying forty-one countries'
respective polices on, among other things, whether Bitcoin is legal tender).
45 See, e.g., House Subcommittee Hearing, supra note 22, at 4-5 (statement of Rep. Tony
Cardenas) ("If digital currencies are to be widely accepted at [sic] legitimate payments, they
need to provide sufficient safeguards for their users, and they need to come under an
adequate regulatory regime to address unlawful use, particularly in terms of money
laundering and financing of terrorism.... States are already figuring out how to regulate
Federal agencies are monitoring digital currency
these new products and markets.
markets."); Senate Committee Hearing, supra note 22, at 1-4 (statement of Sen. Thomas R.
Carpet, Chairman, Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs) (stating that Bitcoin
is a "major emerging issue that is deserving of the government's attention").
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use of Bitcoin as an alternative to money and a means of
investment.
A. FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO VIRTUAL CURRENCY LAW AND
REGULATION

In the United States, the legal and regulatory response to
46
Bitcoin has mirrored Bitcoin's growing mainstream acceptance.
Bitcoin initially operated without any real oversight. 47 Although
Bitcoin arguably fell within the ambit of several existing legal and
regulatory regimes, 48 Bitcoin was little known and seldom used. 49
Therefore, as a practical matter, it is understandable how
activities involving Bitcoin initially escaped the attention of
policymakers.
A number of factors have contributed to the push towards
greater regulation in the United States. First, Bitcoin has seen
growing mainstream acceptance as an alternative to money and
other traditional methods of payment like checks, and credit and
debit cards. The number of daily Bitcoin transactions continues to
rise, 50 with a growing number of merchants, including large
companies like Microsoft, Dell, and Expedia, now accepting Bitcoin
for online purchases.5 1 Increasingly, Bitcoin can be used to make
purchases at brick and mortar locations too. For example, both the
Sacramento Kings basketball team52 and the San Jose Earthquakes
soccer team 53 now accept Bitcoin at their respective stadiums for the
4 See generally James Gatto & Elsa S. Broeker, Bitcoin and Beyond: Current and Future
Regulation of Virtual Currencies, 9 OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 429 (2015)
(providing an overview of recent efforts to regulate virtual currency in the United States).
47 See Tu & Meredith, supra note 7, at 296 (arguing that because Bitcoin initially
"operated entirely outside of the traditional financial system and had very few users," it had
"evaded the attention of both regulators and the mainstream public").
48 See id. at 305 (offering examples of existing legal and regulatory regimes, including
both federal and state solutions, that may be interpreted to apply to virtual currencies).
49 See id. at 296.
50 See Jeremy Light, Where are Bitcoin Transaction Volumes Heading?, ACCENTURE:
BANKING BLOG (Sept. 21, 2015), http://bankingblog.accenture.comwhere-are-bitcoin-transa
ction-volumes-heading (reporting a 69% increase in the total number of Bitcoin transactions
between August 2014 and August 2015).

51 See supra note 16.

See Casey, supranote 15.
Press Release, Earthquakes Media Relations, Quakes Become First Team to Accept
Bitcoin Payments (May 19, 2014), http://www.sjearthquakes.com/post/2014/05/19/quakes-be
come-first-team-accept-bitcoin-payments.
52
53
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purchase of tickets, merchandise, and concessions. In discussing
the decision to accept Bitcoin, Vivek Ranadiv6, the owner of the
Sacramento Kings, noted that "[B]itcoin had reached a tipping point
where it had crossed from being a curiosity to a [sic] becoming a
54
legitimate form of doing commerce."
Though far from being universally accepted, the increase as an
acceptable payment method has arguably accelerated the regulation
of virtual currencies. It has been noted that "[t]he payment systems
of the United States are regulated under a complex matrix of
Both banks and nonbank financial
federal and state laws." 55
institutions are subject to regulation. 56 Broadly stated, the primary
objectives of these requirements are to ensure the safety and
soundness of the banking system5 7 and to aid law enforcement in
identifying illegal activity.5 8 To the extent that Bitcoin functions as
an alternative to traditional payment systems, it raises the same
regulatory concerns. However, Bitcoin poses unique challenges
because it does not constitute legal tender. 59 Instead, Bitcoin is a
decentralized crypto-currency that is not backed by a government or
central bank.60 These features distinguish Bitcoin from traditional
payment systems, which provide different, government-backed
mechanisms for making payments of legal tender. Accordingly, as
Bitcoin payments became more commonplace, the impetus to

54 Casey, supra note 15.
55 Richard L. Field, 1996: Survey of the Year's Developments in Electronic Cash Law and the
Laws Affecting Electronic Banking in the United States, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 967, 970 (1997).
56 See Mehrsa Baradaran, Regulation by Hypothetical, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1247, 1253-82
(2014) (discussing bank regulation since the Great Depression); see also Kerry Lynn
Macintosh, The New Money, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 659 (1999) (discussing regulation of
nonbank money services businesses); Helen A. Garten, Regulatory Growing Pains: A
Perspective on Bank Regulation in a Deregulatory Age, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 501 (1989)
(discussing "the shift in regulatory strategy that.., accompanied deregulation of banking"
in the twentieth century).
57 See Garten, supra note 56, at 503 ('The fundamental aim of traditional bank
regulation, protection of the safety and soundness of the banking system, remains an
(emphasis added) (citation omitted)).
important concern of regulators ....
58 Pursuant to the Money Laundering Suppression Act of 1994, Congress amended the
Bank Secrecy Act to require any business engaging in money transmitting services to
register with FinCEN. See Macintosh, supra note 56, at 667-68. This would presumably
allow law enforcement agencies to more easily detect illegal uses of money transmitting
services such as money laundering.
1) See Tu & Meredith, supra note 7, at 278.
60 See id. at 278-79.
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regulate virtual currency as a new and distinct payment system has
become more pronounced.
Second, the value of Bitcoin has grown to such a degree that
transactions involving Bitcoin have become higher stakes and
more deserving of oversight. In 2009, New Liberty Standard
published the first Bitcoin exchange rate, valuing 1,309.03 BTC as
equal to one U.S. Dollar. 61 Bitcoin's value surged in 2017, with the
price in December 2017 reaching $19,783.21 per Bitcoin before
dropping to $8,690 per Bitcoin on March 22, 2018.62 Where the
implications of Bitcoin-related problems were once monetarily
insignificant, the growth in value of Bitcoin now means that
substantial amounts of money can be at stake. A customer
victimized by the theft of Bitcoin or the failure of a Bitcoin
exchange may lose a material sum. A dispute between a buyer
and seller over a Bitcoin payment can now involve a significant
amount. An investor in Bitcoin may suffer a meaningful financial
loss due to fraud or price volatility. As a result, the financial
implications are no longer negligible, thus heightening the need
for a more developed regime of virtual currency regulation.
Third, a series of well-publicized scandals involving Bitcoin has
linked the virtual currency to illicit activity, while also
highlighting the potential risks associated with the currency.
Much of the general public first became aware of Bitcoin in
connection with the Silk Road, a Dark Web black market for the
purchase and sale of illegal goods such as drugs and forged
identity documents. 63
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
ultimately shut down the Silk Road, 64 and Ross William Ulbricht,
the alleged founder and owner of the Silk Road, was convicted on
seven counts, including distributing narcotics and engaging in a

61 History of Bitcoin: The World's First Decentralized Currency, HISTORYOFBITcOIN.ORG,
http://historyofbitcoin.org/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2018).
62 See Bitcoin (USD) Price, supra note 39; see also Bitcoin Boom Prompts Growth of Coinmining Malware, BBC NEWS (Oct. 20, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-41693556.
62 See BRITO & CASTILLO, supra note 6, at 23-24.
64 See Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announces the Indictment
of Ross Ulbricht, the Creator and Owner of the "Silk Road" Website (Feb. 4, 2014), https://
www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr-manhattan-us-attorney-announces-indictment-ross-ulbricht-cre
ator-and-owner-silk-road ("[Ross Ulbricht] owned and operated [Silk Road] until it was shut
down by law enforcement authorities in October 2013.").
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continuing criminal enterprise. 65 The Silk Road accepted only one
form of payment: Bitcoin. 66 Cases highlighting the potential for
Bitcoin to be used in connection with criminal activity have also
started to reach the judicial systems. For example, criminals have
requested ransom payments in Bitcoin, 67 and defendants charged
with identity theft have admitted to using Bitcoin to purchase
stolen credit card numbers and fraudulent driver's licenses on the
Internet. 6s As a result, some view Bitcoin as inextricably tied to
illicit activity and useful only for criminals. 69 To be fair, any form
of payment can be used for both legitimate and illegitimate
purposes. However, certain characteristics of Bitcoin make it
Bitcoin transactions are
particularly attractive to criminals.
70 and generally occur outside of the heavily
pseudo-anonymous

65 See United States v. Ulbricht, 858 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2017) (affirming Ulbricht's
Conviction and Sentence); United States v. Ulbricht, 31 F. Supp. 3d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)
(denying Ulbricht's motion to dismiss); Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Ross Ulbricht, A/K/A
"Dread Pirate Roberts," Sentenced in Manhattan Federal Court to Life in Prison (May 29,
2015), https://www.justice. gov/usao-sdny/pr/ross-ulbricht-aka-dread-pirate-roberts-sentence
d-manhattan-federal-court-life-prison; Benjamin Weiser, Man Behind Silk Road Website is
Convicted on All Counts, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2015), https://nyti.ms/2yr3z9M.
66 See Weiser, supra note 65 ("Deals were conducted in Bitcoins, and Mr. Ulbricht took
millions of dollars in commissions .... ').
67 See, for example, United States v. Brown, 857 F.3d 334, 336 (6th Cir. 2017), where the
defendant Michael Brown, aka "Dr. Evil," had "demanded $1 million in Bitcoin in exchange
for an encryption key to Mitt Romney's unreleased tax returns"; and Ebates, Inc. v. Does,
No. 16-cv-01925-JST, 2016 WL 2344199 (N.D. Cal. May 3, 2016), where those who were
responsible for shutting down the Ebates website using Distributed Denial of Service
attacks extorted Ebates and demanded payment in Bitcoin.
68 See, e.g., Portuondo v. United States, No. 16-CV-24874-COHN, 2016 BL 402277, at *2
(S.D. Fla. Nov. 30, 2016) (stating that Mr. Portuondo admitted to purchasing stolen credit
card numbers using Bitcoin).
69 See BR1TO & CASTILLO, supra note 6, at 23-24 ('Bitcoin's association with Silk Road has
tarnished its reputation.'); see also Jim Edwards, Bitcoin is Basically for Criminals, BUS.
INSIDER (Nov. 27, 2013, 12:30 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/claim-bitcoin-is-basicallyfor-criminals-2013-11 ("Bitcoin basically solves the banking problem for criminals."); E.J.
Fagan, Bitcoin and InternationalCrime [Commentary], BALT. SUN (Nov. 25, 2013, 2:00 PM),
(claiming
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/oped/bs-ed-bitcoin-20131125-story.html
Bitcoin is "an attractive currency to criminals--particularly those who prey on the weak").
70 Bitcoin addresses do not contain any personally identifiable information, but a log of
all transactions is available to the public. Using deanonymization techniques, however, it
may be possible to discover the identity of a person with publicly available data. See Danny
Bradbury, How Anonymous is Bitcoin?, CoINDESK (June 7, 2013, 10:04 AM), http://www.
coindesk.com/how-anonymous-is-bitcoin/
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regulated banking system. 71 This makes it more difficult for law
enforcement to identify and investigate suspicious activity. For
those engaged in criminal activity, the speed and irreversibility of
72
Bitcoin transfers are also potentially attractive features.
Therefore, the push for greater regulation is largely a response to
the unique characteristics of Bitcoin and the legitimate needs of
law enforcement.
Finally, Bitcoin has suffered from several high-profile losses,
thefts, and failures. Mt. Gox, once the world's largest Bitcoin
exchange, is perhaps the most well-known example. Mt. Gox filed
for bankruptcy after losing 850,000 Bitcoins valued at more than
$460 million at the time. 73 More recently, hackers successfully
targeted BitStamp, the world's third largest Bitcoin exchange,
74
stealing over 18,000 Bitcoins valued at more than $5 million.
Unlike Mt. Gox, BitStamp survived the security breach, reopening
after promising to fully honor customer account balances. 75 Mt.
Gox and BitStamp both highlight growing concerns over the
security of Bitcoin exchanges and the lack of recourse for the
victims of such losses and thefts. Because Bitcoin transactions are
non-reversible and Bitcoin exchanges are not protected by the
equivalent of deposit insurance, 76 the proliferation of virtual
currency regulation can be partly attributed to the need to protect
customers from the risk of loss presented by Bitcoin.
71 See BRITO & CASTILLO, supra note 6, at 26 (discussing the applicability of anti-money
laundering controls to virtual currency); Tu & Meredith, supra note 7, at 339 (noting that
virtual currency is not a bank nor regulated as such).
72 See BRITO & CASTILLO, supra note 6, at 11-12.
73 See Robert McMillan, The Inside Story of Mt. Gox, Bitcoin's $460 Million Disaster,WIRED
(Mar. 3, 2014, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/2014/03/bitcoin-exchange/ ("[Hackers had been
slamming money from the company for years.").
14 See Stan Higgins, Details of $5 Million Bitstamp Hack Revealed, COINDESK (July 1,
2015, 10:45 PM), http://www.coindesk.com/unconfirmed-report-5-million-bitstamp-bitcoinexchange/; Kaja Whitehouse, BitStamp's Bitcoin "Breach"Results in Loss of $5.4M, USA
TODAY (Jan. 6, 2015, 6:03 PM), http://usat.ly/1Bo05t.
75 See Whitehouse, supra note 74 ("The [B]itcoin operator also promised to make burned
customers whole, saying it has enough funding to cover the loss.').
76 See Some Things You Need to Know, BITCOIN.ORG, https://bitcoin.org/enlyou-need-toknow (last visited Oct. 26, 2017) ("Any transaction issued with Bitcoin cannot be reversed,
they can only be refunded by the person receiving the funds."); Kyle Torpey, Bitcoin Hacks:
Why Exchanges Don't Insure Bitcoin Deposits, INSIDE BITCOINS (Feb. 19, 2015), http://inside
bitcoins.com/news/bitcoin-hacks-why-exchanges.don't-insure-bitcoin-deposits/30045 ("Sadly,
it seems insured bitcoin deposits are the Voldemort of bitcoin exchanges-the concept that
shall not be named.").
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In sum, the growth in both mainstream use and value of
Bitcoin, coupled with the unique regulatory concerns of virtual
currency, has prompted a regulatory reaction in the United States.
Regulation became viewed as necessary in order to facilitate the
ongoing use of Bitcoin (and the growing Bitcoin economy of virtual
currency businesses and service providers), while also mitigating
its well-publicized risks.
B. THE CURRENT LEGAL AND REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT

Despite the desire to regulate, difficulties understanding
Bitcoin and the blockchain technology upon which it is based likely
slowed the development of Bitcoin regulation. Senator Thomas
Carper, Chairman of the Committee on Homeland Security and
Government Affairs, captured the early sentiments of many
policymakers: "[v]irtual currencies, perhaps most notably Bitcoin,
have captured the imagination of some, struck fear among others,
and confused the heck out of the rest of us .... ,,77 Though
regulation frequently lags behind new innovations and
technological advances, progress has been made toward developing
and implementing a regulatory regime for virtual currency.
Though the contours of Bitcoin regulation have started to take
shape, regulation is still in its infancy. To date, regulatory
developments largely fall into one of two categories: (1) guidance
on how Bitcoin fits within existing law, and, more recently, (2) the
enactment of new Bitcoin-specific laws. Despite considerable
progress, the substantive scope of Bitcoin regulation is relatively
limited. As examined below, Bitcoin regulation has focused
primarily on what can be described loosely as "financial
regulation" of Bitcoin as an alternative to money and a means of
investment. Thus, regulation has not expanded much beyond the
concerns raised in Part II.A above-preventing criminal activity
and protecting the public from harm.
1. Guidance for Applying Existing Law. The earliest responses
to the rise of Bitcoin have involved efforts to clarify the treatment
of virtual currency under existing law. The issuance of both
interpretative guidance and judicial opinions has increased
certainty as to the applicability of laws that were not enacted with
77 Senate Committee Hearing,supra note 22, at 1.
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virtual currency expressly in mind. Moreover, these efforts have
started to solidify Bitcoin law and regulation in the areas of tax,
money transmission, and securities.
a. Tax Treatment. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issued
a notice in March 2014 to clarify the tax implications of virtual
currency transactions. 78
The IRS's position is that virtual
currencies with an equivalent value in real currency are treated as
property for federal tax purposes. 79 Among other things, this
means that an employer must report wages paid in Bitcoin on
Form W-2, and Bitcoin payments received by a taxpayer in
exchange for goods and services are taxable as income based on
fair market value.80 In short, the general tax principles that apply
to property transactions also apply to transactions using virtual
81
currency.
b. Federal and State Money Transmitter Laws. Regulators
have also issued interpretive guidance about the applicability of
the federal Bank Secrecy Act (BSA)8 2 and corresponding state
money transmitter laws 83-both of which generally regulate the
transfer of money or monetary value.8 4 As applied to virtual
currency, the foundational issue is whether virtual currency
constitutes "money" within the scope of the respective statutes.
Despite the overlapping subject matter, the BSA and state
money transmitter laws have different regulatory goals. The BSA
focuses on the detection and prevention of money laundering and
other criminal activity,8 5 imposing a comprehensive reporting and
78 See I.R.S. News Release IR-2014-36 (Mar. 25, 2014), https://www.irs.gov/uac/Newsroo
mdIRS-Virtual-Currency-Guidance.
79 See I.R.S. Notice 2014-21, supra note 27, at 938.
80 See id. at 939.
81 See id. at 938.
82 Bank Secrecy Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-5332 (2012).
83 See, e.g., Transmitters of Money Act, 205 ILL. COMp. STAT. ANN. 657 / 1-105 (West 2017).
84 See Kevin V. Tu, Regulating the New Cashless World, 65 ALA. L. REV. 77, 93 (2013)
("Licensed money transmitters must also comply with regulatory requirements aimed at
protecting the public by ensuring that money transmitters have sufficient resources to
honor their obligations to consumer customers .... ).
85 31 U.S.C. § 5311 (stating the purpose of the BSA is to require records for use "in
criminal, tax, or regulatory investigations or proceedings, or in the conduct of intelligence or
counterintelligence activities, including analysis, to protect against international
terrorism"); see also Scott Sultzer, Money Laundering: The Scope of the Problem and
Attempts to Combat It, 63 TENN. L. REV. 143, 153-54 (1995) (explaining that Congress
hoped that the BSA would achieve two things: (1) "it wanted to create a paper trail which
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recordkeeping regime designed to assist with law enforcement
efforts to identify and investigate suspicious transactions.8 6 In
contrast, state money transmitter laws focus more on protecting
To that end, state money
consumers from monetary loss. 8 7
transmitter laws employ a range of regulatory compliance
requirements, including investigation and examination, surety
bonds, and minimum net worth requirements, to ensure safety and
88
soundness.
These laws traditionally applied to money transfer services such
as Western Union, but their applicability to different Bitcoin
transactions was unclear. In March 2013, the Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network (FinCEN) set forth its position.8 9 FinCEN
determined that the BSA and its anti-money laundering
requirements extend to "exchangers" and "administrators" of virtual
currency, but not to "users" of virtual currency. 90 Thus, a person
who is engaged in the business of accepting currency, or anything of
value that substitutes for currency (including Bitcoin), from one
person and then transmitting it to another person or location is
subject to regulation under the BSA. But a person who simply
obtains virtual currency and uses it purchase goods or services is
not. 91 Case law92 has consistently affirmed the view that virtual
would inform law enforcement of potentially suspicious activity," and (2) "[it] hoped to use
the BSA as a weapon to prosecute money launderers" (citations omitted)).
86 See Tu & Meredith, supra note 7, at 322-26.
87 See Tu, supra note 84, at 93 & nn.93-99 (listing requirements imposed by various
states which aim to protect the public from the potential insolvency of licensed money
transmitters); BRITO & CASTILLO, supra note 6, at 29-30 ('CThe purpose of state licensing of
money transmission has traditionally been consumer protection.').
88 See Tu & Meredith, supra note 7, at 331-32.
89 See FIN-213-G007, supra note 24.
90Id.; see also U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, FIN. CRIMES ENVT NETWORK, FIN-2014-R011,
REQUEST FOR ADMINISTRATIVE RULING ON THE APPLICATION OF FINCEN'S REGULATIONS TO A
VIRTUAL CURRENCY TRADING PLATFORM (2014); U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, FIN. CRIMES

EN'T NETWORK, FIN-2014-R012, REQUEST FOR ADMINIsTRATivE RULING ON THE APPLICATION
OF FINCEN'S REGULATIONS TO A VIRTUAL CURRENCY PAYMENT SYSTEM (2014).
91 See FIN-2013-GO01, supra note 24 (stating that simply obtaining virtual currency and
using it to purchase real or virtual goods or services is not the kind of activity that is subject
to FinCEN's registration, reporting, and recordkeeping regulations for money services
businesses).
92 See, e.g., United States v. Mansy, No. 2:15-cr-198-GZS, 2017 BL 157831 (D. Me. May
11, 2017); United States v. Lord, No. 15-00240-01/02, 2017 WL 1424806 (W.D. La. Apr. 20,
2017); United States v. Murgio, 209 F. Supp. 3d 698 (S.D.N.Y. 2016); United States v. 50.44
Bitcoins, No. ELH-15-3692, 2016 BL 171855 (D. Md. May 31, 2016); United States v.
Budovsky, No. 13cr368 (DLC), 2015 BL 308937 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2015); United States v.
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currency is "money" or "funds" within the meaning of the federal
statute prohibiting unlicensed money transmitting businesses. 93
At the state level, a handful of regulators have issued guidance
to clarify the applicability of state money transmitter laws. 94 For
example, the Texas Department of Banking in a 2014 memorandum
concluded that decentralized virtual currencies such as Bitcoin are
not money and have no intrinsic monetary value-reasoning that
Bitcoin is not legal tender, it does not represent a claim on a
commodity, and it is not convertible by law. 95 Therefore the Texas
money transmitter law does not apply to the transfer of Bitcoin
unless the transaction also involves the transfer of legal tender. 96
Thus, the acceptance and transfer of Bitcoin alone from one person
to another person or location is not regulated. But an exchange that
accepts U.S. dollars from a buyer of Bitcoin and then transfers that
money to the seller of the Bitcoin is typically subject to regulation. 97
Considering the guidance from FinCEN and various state
regulators, along with developing case law, it appears that some
but not all transactions involving the transfer of Bitcoin will
escape regulation under the BSA and state money transmitter
laws. Broadly speaking, the following activities are unlikely to fall
within the scope of regulation: (1) obtaining Bitcoin by mining,
purchase, or otherwise; (2) using Bitcoin to purchase goods or
services; and (3) transferring Bitcoin between two parties without
the use of a third-party intermediary.
However, Bitcoin exchanges that act as intermediaries for the
transfer of Bitcoin are likely subject to regulation under the BSA
as well as state money transmitter laws. This is particularly true
if the transfer also involves the exchange of legal tender for
Faiella, 39 F. Supp. 3d 544 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); United States v. E-Gold, Ltd., 550 F. Supp. 2d
82 (D.D.C. 2008). But see United States v. Petix, No. 15-CR-227A, 2016 BL 399330
(W.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2016) (holding that "Bitcoin in not 'money' as people ordinarily
understand that term" as it "does not issue from or enjoy the protection of any sovereign";
therefore, the transmission of Bitcoin does not come within the reach of 18 U.S.C. § 1960).
93 18 U.S.C. § 1960 (2012).
94 See, e.g., KAN. OFFICE OF THE STATE BANK COMM'R, supra note 25; TEX. DEP'T OF
BANKING, supra note 25; WASH. STATE DEP'T OF FIN. INSTS., supra note 25.

95 See TEX. DEP'T OF BANKING, supra note 25, at 2.
96 See id. at 2-3.
97 Id. But see State v. Espinoza, No. F14-2923 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 22, 2016) (granting
defendant's motion to dismiss on the grounds that Bitcoin is not money and does not fall
within any other category enumerated in Florida's money transmitter law).
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Bitcoin, or vice versa. Thus, regulatory requirements of the BSA
and state money transmitter laws have been extended to certain
transfers of decentralized virtual currency. In doing so, these
regulatory developments apply to Bitcoin as an alternative to
money and address concerns about the use of Bitcoin to facilitate
criminal activity and to prevent consumers from suffering losses.
c. Securities Law. The Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA)
have both issued a series of Investor Alerts to caution investors
about the heightened risks of investing in virtual currency. 98
These Investor Alerts identify a range of potential risks, including
lack of insurance, 99 price volatility, 10 0 data security, 10 1 and Bitcoinbased Ponzi schemes and scams.1 0 2 Although these Investor Alerts
serve an important educational purpose, they fail to clarify
whether federal securities laws apply to virtual currency.
However, SEC enforcement actions and litigation involving
defrauded Bitcoin investors 10 3 have provided the judiciary with the
opportunity to begin developing this area of virtual currency law.
98 See FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTHOR., INVESTOR ALERT: BiTcoiN: MORE THAN A BIT
RISKY (2014) [hereinafter FINRA ALERT], http://www.finra.org/investors/alertsbitcoin-more-b
it-risky; SEC OFFICE OF INV'R EDUC. AND ADVOCACY, INVESTOR ALERT: BITCOIN AND OTHER
VIRTUAL CURRENCY-RELATED INVESTMENTS (2014) [hereinafter SEC BITCOIN ALERT], https:/!
www.sec.gov/oieainvestor-alerts-bulletins/investoralertsia-bitcoin.html; SEC OFFICE OF INV'R
EDUC. AND ADVOCACY, INVESTOR ALERT: PONZI SCHEMES USING VIRTUAL CURRENCIES (2013)
[hereinafter SEC PONZi ALERT], https://www.sec.gov/investor/alertslia.virtualcurrencies.pdf.
9 See SEC BITCOIN ALERT, supra note 98 ("While securities accounts at U.S. Brokerage
firms are often insured by the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC) and bank
accounts at U.S. banks are often insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC), bitcoins held in a digital wallet or Bitcoin exchange currently do not have similar
protections.").
100 See FINRA ALERT, supra note 98 (warning that Bitcoin is "subject to wide price
swings"); SEC BITCOIN ALERT, supra note 98 ('The exchange rate of Bitcoin historically has
been very volatile and the exchange rate of Bitcoin could drastically decline.").
101 See FINRA ALERT, supra note 98 (warning that Bitcoin platforms, as well as digital
wallets that contain Bitcoin, can be hacked); SEC BITCOIN ALERT, supra note 98 (warning
that "Bitcoin exchanges may stop operating or permanently shut down due to fraud,
technical glitches, hackers or malware" and "Bitcoins ...may be stolen by hackers').
102 See FINRA ALERT, supra note 98 (describing charges brought against Bitcoin
companies by the SEC for conducting Bitcoin Ponzi schemes); SEC PONZI ALERT, supra note
98 (describing the nature of a Ponzi scheme, and warning that Bitcoin's greater privacy
benefits and lack of regulatory oversight is attracting fraudsters to its use).
103 See, e.g., Complaint at 1-3, SEC v. Garza, No. 3:15-cv-01760 (D. Conn. Dec. 1, 2015)
(alleging that defendants "sold far more [investment contracts] worth of computing power
than they actually had in their computing centers," that they misrepresented their virtual
currency mining operations to investors and potential investors, and that their sales
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In SEC v. Shavers, a federal magistrate judge determined that
Bitcoin is "a currency or form of money." 10 4 The magistrate judge
reasoned that Bitcoin can be used as money to purchase goods or
services and it can be exchanged for "conventional currencies" such
as the U.S. dollar. 10 5 The judge concluded that investors who
make an investment in Bitcoin provide an "investment in money"
within the definition of an "investment contract," which is subject
10 6
to regulation under federal securities laws.
The court ultimately determined that Shavers failed to comply
with federal securities law in several respects.10 7 By offering and
selling an investment in Bitcoin over the Internet without filing a
registration statement, Shavers violated Section 5 of the Securities
Act of 1933.108
In addition, Shavers made several material
misrepresentations to investors in violation of Section 17(a) of the
Securities Act of 1933 and Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.109 Thus, the decision appears
to open the door to a host of securities regulations that may now
apply to the offer or sale of investments in Bitcoin-most notably
the filing of a registration with the SEC and anti-fraud liability.
The foregoing highlights how the judiciary has made some
progress toward developing a legal and regulatory framework that
accommodates the growth of virtual currency as a potential
investment. More specifically, it applies securities regulations to
Bitcoin investments in a way that addresses the concern about
protecting the investing public from suffering losses.
2. Creating New Law Specific to Virtual Currency. While much
of the developing framework for virtual currency has centered on
clarifying its treatment under existing laws and regulations, some
states have enacted new licensing regimes specific to virtual
currency. 110
Further, other states are at varying stages of
resembled a Ponzi scheme in that "some investors' funds were used to make payments to
other investors"); Complaint at 1-2, SEC v. Shavers, No. 4:13-cv-00416, 2013 WL 3810441
(E.D. Tex. July 23, 2013).
104 SEC v. Shavers, No. 4:13-CV-416, 2013 WL 4028182, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2013).
105
106

Id.
Id.

107SEC v. Shavers, No. 4:13-CV-416, 2014 WL 4652121, at *8-9 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 18, 2014).
108 Id. at *9.
at *8.
109 Id.
110 See, e.g., N.Y. ORDER, supra note 28; VIRTUAL CURRENCY REGS., supra note 28; Money
Transmission Act, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 36a-595 to -612 (West 2017); North Carolina
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considering proposed virtual currency regulation.1 1 These efforts
demonstrate the progress that has been made toward tailoring the
law to virtual currency and the risks associated with its use. State
licensing of virtual currency, however, largely covers the same
transactions and regulatory concerns as the BSA and state money
transmitter laws. This is because states have either used these
frameworks as a starting point for new legislation1 2 or simply opted
to legislate virtual currency under the state money transmitter
law. 11 3 Thus, state licensing regimes-while more comprehensive
and specific to virtual currency-are generally limited to addressing
the same old concerns about criminal activity and consumer
protection.
a. State Licensing Regimes. State licensing regimes such as
New York's BitLicense1 4 generally seek to impose a host of
regulatory requirements designed to: (1) ensure the safety and
soundness of the virtual currency business; and (2) assist law
enforcement with the identification and investigation of financial
crimes. The requirements of New York's BitLicense highlight
these dual regulatory objectives.
To ensure safety and soundness, under New York's BitLicense
1 15
any person engaging in a "Virtual Currency Business Activity"
must apply for and obtain a license from the Superintendent of
Money Transmitters Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53-208.41 to -208.64 (West 2017); Money
Transmitter Act, 7 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 6101-6117 (West 2017).
111 See, e.g., H.B. 1045, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wa. 2017); A.B. 1326, Cal. Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Ca. 2015).
112 See Benjamin M. Lawsky, Superintendent of Fin. Servs., N.Y. State Dep't of Fin. Servs.,
Remarks at BITS Emerging Payments Forum (June 3, 2015) (transcript available at http://
arcbive.is/5Jiyd) (discussing New York's newly created BitLicense framework for regulating
virtual currency firms).
113 See sources cited supra notes 110-11.
114 See N.Y. VIRTUAL CURRENCY REGS., supra note 28.
115 A "Virtual Currency Business Activity" is defined as
the conduct of any one of the following types of activities involving New
York or a New York Resident: (1) receiving Virtual Currency for
Transmission or Transmitting Virtual Currency, except where the
transaction is undertaken for non-financial purposes and does not involve
the transfer of more than a nominal amount of Virtual Currency; (2)
storing, holding, or maintaining custody or control of Virtual Currency on
behalf of others; (3) buying and selling Virtual Currency as a customer
business; (4) performing Exchange Services as a customer business; or (5)
controlling, administering, or issuing a Virtual Currency.
0
Id. § 2 0.2(q).
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Financial Services. 116 The application process gives the
Superintendent a preliminary opportunity to evaluate each
applicant's fitness to operate a virtual currency business.117
After approval, licensees must comply with a number of ongoing
requirements to ensure safety and soundness.11 8 Although the
regulatory requirements are numerous, the following examples are
illustrative of their scope.
First, the New York BitLicense provides for oversight by the
Superintendent.
Licensees must obtain approval from the
Superintendent for any change of control and for any material
change of business, including the introduction of new products or
services. 119 Licensees are also subject to examination by the
Superintendent2 ° and must comply with substantial recordkeeping
and reporting requirements.1 2'
Second, the New York BitLicense seeks to protect customer
assets and to prevent losses. Licensees must disclose the material
risks of engaging in virtual currency business activity to their
customers and provide customers with transaction receipts. 122 In
addition, licensees must satisfy minimum capital requirements by
maintaining an amount of capital that is sufficient to ensure the
financial integrity of the licensee, 123 and maintain a surety bond or
trust account for the benefit of its customers. 124 Licensees that
hold virtual currency for another person must keep virtual
currency of the same type and amount that is obligated to such
person.1 25 Accordingly, licensees are generally prohibited from
selling, transferring, or otherwise using or encumbering virtual
currency held for another person. 126

Id. §§ 200.3-200.4.
Id. § 200.6(a).
118 See, e.g., id. § 200.7 (requiring each licensee to comply with applicable federal and state
laws and maintain and enforce written compliance policies related to, among other things,
anti-fraud, anti-money laundering, and cyber security).
119Id. §§ 200.10-200.11.
120 Id. § 200.13.
121 Id. §§ 200.12, 200.14.
122 Id. § 200.19(a).
123 Id. § 200.8.
124 Id. § 200.9(a).
125 Id. § 200.9(b).
126 Id. § 200.9(c).
116

117
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Third, the New York BitLicense requires effective cyber
security to protect the licensee's systems and stored customer
data. Specifically, licensees must maintain an effective cyber
security program to protect their electronic systems from
unauthorized access, use, or tampering. 127 Licensees must also
establish a business continuity and disaster recovery plan to
ensure the availability and functionality of the licensee's services
in the event of an emergency. 128 In sum, the New York licensing
regime contains a number of regulatory requirements that
generally seek to ensure the safety and soundness of the virtual
currency system.
In addition to promoting safety and soundness, New York's
BitLicense supports law enforcement efforts to identify and
investigate financial crimes by mandating that licensees implement
129 As
and enforce a comprehensive anti-money laundering program.
part of the anti-money laundering program, licensees must
maintain records, including detailed information, on all of its virtual
currency transactions.1 30 Licensees, like other regulated financial
institutions, must also report virtual currency transactions in
excess of $10,000,131 and licenses have an affirmative obligation to
monitor transactions for suspicious activity that "might
1 32
signify ... criminal activity."
Finally, the New York licensing regime addresses regulatory
concerns arising out of the pseudo-anonymous nature of virtual
currency. As noted above, this characteristic of virtual currency
may make it more attractive to criminals who wish to hide their
identity.1 33 To tackle this issue, New York requires that each
licensee's anti-money laundering program include a customer
identification program.1 34 The most prominent aspects of the
customer identification program require that licensees: (1) "verify
the customer's identity ... [and] maintain records of the
information used to verify such identity, including name, physical
Id. § 200.16(a).
Id. § 200.17(a).
129 Id. § 200.15(b).
130 Id. § 200.15(e)(1).
131 Id. § 200.15(e)(2).
132 Id. § 200.15(e)(3).
133 See supra notes 70-72, 98 and accompanying text.
134 Id. § 200.15(h).
127

1
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address, and other identifying information" when establishing a
relationship with a new customer; (2) check customers against the
"Specially Designated Nationals" list maintained by the U.S.
Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Asset Control; (3)
implement "[e]nhanced due diligence" procedures for transactions
involving foreign entities; and (4) verify the identity of any customer
initiating a transaction with a value of more than $3,000.135
These regulations highlight how the New York licensing regime
mitigates concerns about the use of virtual currency in the
furtherance of criminal activity by enlisting licensees to aid in the
detection, investigation, and prevention of financial crimes, such
as money laundering and the financing of terrorism.
As the first virtual currency-specific licensing regime enacted in
the United States, 136 the New York BitLicense distinguishes itself
from early efforts to simply clarify the application of existing laws
to virtual currency. Instead, the New York BitLicense takes a
more comprehensive approach to regulating the unique
characteristics and risks of virtual currency by attempting to
address safety and soundness, consumer protection, cyber security,
and the prevention of financial crimes.
Following New York's lead, efforts to develop more
comprehensive laws specific to virtual currency have intensified. In
Connecticut, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania, virtual currency
bills have been signed into law. 13 7 The Washington legislature is
currently considering H.B. 1045, which would extend the licensing
and enforcement provisions applicable to money transmitters and
currency exchanges to virtual currency. 138 Likewise, the California
legislature has considered some 'form of virtual currency
legislation-though California's bill is currently inactive. 139
Like New York's BitLicense, the legislation in each of these
states creates a licensing and regulatory enforcement regime
1a5 Id.
136 See Lawsky, Remarks at the BITS Emerging Payments Forum, supra note 112
(declaring New York's BitLicense to be "the first comprehensive framework for regulating
digital currency firms").
137 Money Transmission Act, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 36a-595 to -612 (West 2017); North
Carolina Money Transmitters Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53-208.41 to -208.64 (West 2017);
Money Transmitter Act, 7 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 6101-6117 (West 2017).
138 H.B. 1045, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wa. 2017).
139A.B. 1326, Cal. Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015).
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specific to virtual currency-either by expanding the existing state
money transmitter law or by adopting new provisions based on the
As compared to New York's
money transmitter framework.
BitLicense, none of the proposed licensing frameworks impose the
same degree of regulatory burden. For example, no state would
require that licensees implement an anti-money laundering
program, verify customer identities, or maintain a cybersecurity
program. 140 Still, the bills generally regulate the same type of
virtual currency activities (i.e., businesses that transfer or
exchange virtual currency on behalf of others) and impose similar
requirements designed to protect consumers (e.g., licensing,
examination, capital or minimum net worth requirements, and
surety bonds). 141 Therefore, state virtual currency legislation is
largely focused on virtual currency within the context of money
transmission and its associated regulatory concerns-preventing
criminal activity and protecting consumers from suffering losses.
b. National Efforts to Shape State Law. With individual
states starting to consider virtual currency licensing, a number of
organizations have attempted to provide tools that can be used by
In doing so, these organizations have provided
the states.
recommended positions and model bills for the licensing and
regulation of virtual currency. The ultimate objectives of each
organization may differ. However, their work can be seen broadly
as an attempt to establish consistency across states and ensure
that state laws are appropriately scaled in order to mitigate
virtual currency's most significant risks while allowing for
continued use and innovation.
Coin Center, a non-profit organization focused on public policy
issues facing cryptocurrency technologies, and the Conference of
State Bank Supervisors (CSBS), an organization of financial
regulators from all fifty states, have each independently issued
Coin
model regulatory frameworks for virtual currency.1 42

141

See sources cited supra note 111.
See sources cited supra note 111.

142

PETER VAN VALKENBURGH & JERRY BRITO, STATE DIGITAL CURRENCY PRINCIPLES AND

140

FRAMEWORK (2017), https://coincenter.org/files/2017-03/statevirtualcurrencyprinciplesandfra
meworkv2.0.pdf; CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, CSBS POLICY ON STATE VIRTUAL

CURRENCY REGULATION (2014) [hereinafter CSBS MODEL REGULATION], https://www.csbs.
org/regulatory/ep/Documents/Forms/AllItems.aspx (find link in the list and follow to download
the pdf version of the document).

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol52/iss2/4

30

Tu: Perfecting Bitcoin

2018]

PERFECTINGBITCOIN

535

Center's State Digital Currency Principlesand Framework and the
CSBS's Model Regulatory Framework do not set forth a full model
bill for states to adopt. Instead, Coin Center and the CSBS
identify essential components of a state virtual currency law (e.g.,
who should be licensed, appropriate exemptions, supervision and
examination, capital requirements, anti-money laundering, books
and records, reporting, and cyber security) and provide
recommended positions for each.
Although the regulatory
frameworks differ in scope, both highlight the concerns specific to
virtual currency businesses that should be addressed by state
143
licensing laws.
In contrast, the Uniform Law Commission has been working to
develop uniform legislation for the states to enact. 144 In 2014, the
Uniform Law Commission's Study Committee on Alternative and
Mobile Payment Systems recommended that a drafting committee
be formed "to prepare draft legislation providing 'commercial law'
rules related to the rights and duties of participants in virtual
currency payments transactions when the transaction execution is
accomplished through the use of an intermediary."' 145 The Study
Committee's final report notes that the committee envisions that
the Drafting Committee would create virtual currency-specific
rules resembling U.C.C. Article 4A, which applies to funds
transfers.1 46
Ultimately, the first version of the Drafting
Committee's draft legislation sets forth the framework for a state
regulatory regime that would cover supervision, licensing,
financial strength and stability, consumer protection, cyber
security, recordkeeping
and
reporting,
and
anti-money
143 VAN VALKENBURGH & BRITO, supra note 142, at 9-34 (offering model language and
policy recommendations for state legislation which address the concerns implicated by
virtual currency); CSBS MODEL REGULATION, supra note 142, at 1 (recommending that
"activities involving third party control of virtual currency, including for the purposes of
transmitting, exchanging, holding, or otherwise controlling virtual currency, should be
subject to state licensure and supervision").
14 See FREDERICK H. MILLER & SARAH JANE HUGHES, UNIF. LAW COMM'N, FINAL STUDY
COMMITTEE ON ALTERNATIVE AND MOBILE PAYMENT SYSTEMS REPORT (2014) [hereinafter
FINAL STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT], http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/Alternative%20a

nd%20Mobile%20Payments/AMPS%2OFinal%2OStudy%2OCommittee%20Report%2012-19-14.
pdf.
145 Id. at 1.
146 Id. ('The Study Committee envisions that the []rafting [C]ommittee might create
rules on the order of U.C.C. Article 4A."); U.C.C. art. 4A (AM. LAW INST. & NAT'L
CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAwS 2017).
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laundering. 147 Thus, the Uniform Law Commission has eschewed
broader "commercial law"-type rules for a more limited model act
148
that largely tracks the New York BitLicense.
c. Limited Scope of Virtual Currency Legal Developments.
There is no doubt that progress has been made toward developing
a comprehensive virtual currency regulatory regime. Bitcoin and
Bitcoin transactions no longer exist wholly outside the purview of
regulation. 149 In a short time, regulators and the judiciary have
issued guidance to clarify the applicability of existing law. In
addition, states have started to consider and enact state licensing
regimes that are specific to virtual currency businesses. Each of
these actions have been important steps in shaping virtual
currency law in the United States. Moreover, these developments
signal a desire to accommodate continued Bitcoin use and
innovation, while mitigating the risks.
Although progress has been made, the scope of regulatory
developments to date remains fairly limited.
All of the
developments focus on the use of Bitcoin in two specific contexts:
either as an alternative to money in the context of money
transmission, or as a potential investment.1 50 Additionally, the
regulatory requirements imposed on Bitcoin have focused almost
147 REGULATION OF VIRTUAL CURRENCIES ACT (NATL CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF.
STATE LAWS, Draft 2015), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/regulation%20of /o20virtua
1%20currencies/2015octRVCAMtg%/2ODraft.pdf; see also Pete Rizzo, US Law Commission to
Debate Model Digital Currency Bill in DC, COINDESK (Oct. 6, 2015, 10:45 PM), https:/Iwww.
coindesk.com/ulc-debate-digital-currency-regulation/ ("[The first version of the draft bill puts
forth a set of initial recommendations for how entities operating 'trusted intermediaries' in the
digital currencies space should be licensed across the US so that requirements are more
consistent.").
148 See FINAL STUDY COMMrTTEE REPORT, supra note 144, at 5; see also Memorandum
from Edwin E. Smith to Members of, and Advisers and Observers to, the Drafting Comm.
on the Unif. Regulation of Virtual Currency Bus. Act (Feb. 13, 2017), http://www.uniformla
ws.org/shared/docs/regulation%20of%2virtual%20currencies/2017feb13-RVCBAMemo%2
Ore%20UCC%2OArticle%208_Smith.pdf (noting that incorporation into the Act of a
statutory scheme for the holding and transfer of investment securities "may preclude or
interfere with other efforts at the federal or state level to provide protections to users or to
address the commercial law issues relating to virtual currency"); Lawrence J. Trautman &
Alvin C. Harrell, Bitcoin Versus Regulated Payment Systems: What Gives?, 33 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1041, 1084-87 (2017) (discussing the Uniform Law Commission's consideration of New
York's BitLicense in drafting its model act).
149 See, e.g., FINAL STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 144, at 2 (noting that "[b]ecause
virtual currencies do not enjoy comparable statutory or regulatory underpinnings to other
payment systems, the states are under pressure to act).
160 See supra Part II.B.
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exclusively on addressing the concerns highlighted in Part II.Athe use of virtual currency to facilitate illegal activity and the
potential for the public to suffer losses.
In extending the BSA and state money transmitter laws to
virtual currency, FinCEN and state regulators presumably
recognized that the transfer of virtual currency by a third-party
intermediary raises many of the same issues as traditional money
transfers. Those that facilitate transfers of virtual currency are in a
unique position that allows them to identify suspicious transactions
and retain records that may assist law enforcement investigations.
As discussed above, virtual currency has been famously used in
connection with illegal activity. 151 Furthermore, characteristics
such as increased anonymity may make it more attractive to
criminals. 152 The imposition of anti-money laundering reporting
and recordkeeping requirements addresses these concerns by
enlisting those involved in the transaction to aid in law enforcement
153
efforts to detect and investigate such activity.
Like the acceptance of money, the acceptance of virtual
currency by a third-party service provider for the purpose of
transferring it to another person or location implicates concerns
about customer losses. The third-party is taking something of
value on behalf of the customer; therefore, the failure to take
proper care or to fully perform can result in a monetary loss. As
compared to money, the digital nature of virtual currency, and the
fact that transactions are non-reversible, likely heightens the risk
of theft and loss. 154 Thus, the imposition of requirements to ensure
the financial strength and capability of the service provider to
perform (e.g., investigation and examination, surety bonds, and
minimum net worth requirements) are aimed at protecting
customers from harm.

151 See supra Part II.A.
152

See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-496, VIRTUAL CURRENCIES: EMERGING

REGULATORY,

LAw

ENFORCEMENT,

AND

CONSUMER

PROTECTION

CHALLENGES

(2014)

[hereinafter GAO REPORT] (noting that because virtual currencies "may provide greater
anonymity than traditional payment systems," law enforcement may find it more difficult to
detect crimes involving virtual currencies); see also Tu & Meredith, supranote 7, at 297-99.
153 See supra Part II.B.2.a (discussing the reporting and security requirements imposed by
New York's BitLicense on licensees).
154 See BRITO & CASTILLO, supra note 6, at 11-12.
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New state laws creating licensing regimes are specific to virtual
currency businesses and, in many cases, include a broader range of
regulatory requirements. 1 55 Despite this, the regulation of virtual
currency under state licensing laws still tends to focus on a group of
issues commonly implicated in money transmission and the
provision of financial services: (1) ensuring safety and soundness
through supervision and financial strength; (2) accommodating law
enforcement with transparency and assistance in the identification
of criminal activity; (3) and protecting consumers with disclosures
and cyber security requirements. 156 Thus, state licensing regimes
also regulate a specific type of virtual currency transaction and are
largely limited to addressing many of the same regulatory concerns
as the BSA and state money transmitter laws.
In the context of regulating Bitcoin as an investment, the
judiciary has started to weigh in on the extent to which securities
laws apply. To date, the focus has been on protecting the investing
public from harm by extending registration requirements and antifraud liability. 157 Accordingly, the regulation of Bitcoin as an
investment has been largely limited to the risk of investor losses
due to misrepresentations about investment schemes involving
Bitcoin.
In sum, the regulatory developments have focused on two
principal uses of Bitcoin. Moreover, the compliance requirements
target only the most obvious and well-publicized of concerns
implicated by these uses of Bitcoin. As discussed above, several
incidents involving Bitcoin have highlighted concerns about
These twin concerns
criminal activity and monetary losses.
appear to have largely shaped the initial wave of Bitcoin-related
developments, and to date, Bitcoin-related laws and regulation
have yet to expand much beyond these subjects.

III. THE DISRUPTIVE POTENTIAL OF VIRTUAL CURRENCY IN
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
Virtual currency is a comparatively new phenomenon. Startups, established businesses, and the consuming public are still in
155See supraPart I.B.2.a.
16 See supra Part ll.B.2.a.
157 See supra Part ll.B.1.c.
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Initially, two primary uses

emerged. First, virtual currency was used as an alternative to
money for the purchase of goods and services. 15 9 Second, virtual
160
currency was viewed as a new asset class ripe for investment.
The preceding part demonstrates how the developing legal and
regulatory environment reflects this constrained view about
virtual currency use. But as virtual currency has become more
mainstream, other uses have materialized 161 and it is fair to posit
that more will follow. 1 62 Accordingly, virtual currency has the
potential to disrupt and impact a variety of different industriesnot just remittances and investing.
This Part seeks to expand the conversation. The evolution of
virtual currency use may implicate issues outside of the scope of
current efforts to establish and develop an appropriate legal
framework. If so, it will become increasingly important to consider
the wide reach of virtual currency and how it may impact the law.
To that end, I advance that there are many more questions that
must be deliberated on an ongoing basis. How is virtual currency
being used? What are the legal issues or risks raised by such use?
What, if any, existing laws or regulations are implicated? How
does existing law function? Does the law accommodate this use of
virtual currency? Should the law be modified in any way to
optimize it for the unique attributes of virtual currency and the
risks of a particular use?

158 Cf. Senate Committee Hearing, supra note 22, at 1 (statement of Sen. Thomas R.
Carper, Chairman, Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs) ("Virtual currencies,
perhaps most notably Bitcoin, have captured the imagination of some, struck fear among
others, and confused the heck out of the rest of us, including me.').
159 See GAO REPORT, supra note 152 (stating "virtual currencies can be used to buy real
goods and services and exchanged for dollars or other currencies').
160 See supra Part II.B.
161 See Wallace Young, What Community Bankers Should Know About Virtual Currencies,

COMMUNITY BANKING CONNECTIONS (2015), https://cbcfrs.orglarticles/2015/q2/virtual-curre

ncies (discussing the posting of virtual currency as collateral for a loan).
162 It is also worth noting that the disruptive reach of virtual currency is not limited solely
to new uses or applications that implicate different areas of law. The technology upon
which Bitcoin is based also has applications outside of virtual currency. For example, the
technology could be used to create public, cryptographically secure ledgers for property
interests such as land records, stock certificate entries, and mortgages. See generally
Joshua Fairfield, BitProperty, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 805 (2015) (discussing how blockchain
technology "offer[s] the possibility of decentralized and secure ledgers to maintain" various
types of property).

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2018

35

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 52, No. 2 [2018], Art. 4

540

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:505

To be clear, I do not suggest that every new use or innovation
will demand a new law, regulation, or amendment. However, the
developments described in the preceding Part are only a first step.
Moving forward, it may be necessary to consider whether other
areas of law should be optimized for virtual currency.
At this point, it is necessary to establish a foundational caveat:
The long-term success of virtual currency is unknown. 163 Although
virtual currency has surpassed a tipping-point with respect to
mainstream adoption, 164 it may yet fade away into irrelevance. It
is important to keep in mind that I do not seek to suggest that
legitimizing virtual currency use through regulation is either good
or bad. I simply argue that since steps have already been taken to
regulate virtual currency, the conversation should be expanded to
include its potentially wide-ranging legal implications. Accordingly,
I do not intend to provide commentary on the efficacy of virtual
currency or any of its potential uses. Rather, I start from the U.S.
response to date, which I construe as attempting to create a
framework that balances continued virtual currency growth and
innovation while mitigating the potential risks. Thus, I seek simply
to contribute to the ongoing development of a comprehensive and
appropriate legal framework for virtual currency.
The identification of all the activities and industries that may
be impacted by the mainstream adoption of virtual currency is
beyond the scope of this Article. Although the possibilities are
numerous, the use of virtual currency as collateral is a prime
example of how the evolution of virtual currency may lead to new
uses and expand the scope of current legal and regulatory

developments. 165
163 See, e.g., Young, supra note 161 (noting that it is too early to determine the long-term
success of virtual currency).
164 See supra Part II.A (discussing virtual currency's growing mainstream use in the
United States).
165 See Young, supra note 161; see also M. Sandra Appel, Can You Take a Security Interest in
Bitcoin, DLA PIPER PUBLICATIONS (May 7, 2014), https://www.dlapiper.com/en/canada/insigh
ts/publications/2014/05/can-you-take-a-security-interest-in-bitcoin (concluding that virtual
currency may not easily be used as collateral, but "adding a definition of 'digital currency' to
the Personal Property Security Act and allowing 'perfection' by possession would seem to be
one possible partial solution'); Pamela J. Martinson & Christopher P. Masterson, The Hazards
of Lending to Bitcoin Users, AM. BANKER (Jan. 2, 2014, 12:00 PM), http://www.americanbank
er.comlopinionlthe-hazards-of-lending-to-bitcoin-users ("Owned Bitcoin has the potential to be
collateral for loans, but creditors are likely more concerned with restricting Bitcoin acquisition
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A. EXAMPLES OF VIRTUAL CURRENCY COLLATERAL

Given the monetary value of Bitcoin, 166 lenders and creditors
have started to recognize the potential for virtual currency to serve
as collateral for secured obligations.
The importance of
understanding virtual currency collateral, however, is not limited
to tech-savvy early adopters.
Many lenders and creditors
commonly obtain an "all-assets" security interest that essentially
covers all of the personal property of a debtor. 16 7 Accordingly,
virtual currency collateral may be involved even when there is no
specific intent to pursue it. Virtual currency, therefore, is a reality
that secured creditors must confront. This accentuates the general
relevance of understanding virtual currency collateral, specifically
the practical challenges and the legal requirements for obtaining
an enforceable security interest. At this juncture, a few basic
hypotheticals may provide a helpful illustration.
Imagine that David is in need of $5,000 and Carly agrees to
loan him the money. Carly, however, wants assurances that David
will actually repay the loan, so she asks him to put up something
of value as collateral. David invested in Bitcoin a while back when
it was trading at $400. At the current exchange rate of $6,200 for
one Bitcoin, David's twenty Bitcoins are now worth $124,000.
David agrees to give Carly a security interest in his Bitcoins as
collateral. Carly agrees because the Bitcoins have monetary value
just like David's car, jewelry, personal electronics, comic book
collection, and stocks. David continues to hold most of his Bitcoins
as an investment, but gifts some to his niece as a birthday present.

or use by borrowers due to the uncertain regulatory landscape, irreversible nature of
payments, extreme volatility of value and anonymity of the system."); Jonathan W. Riley,
Heads I win, Tails You Lose? Bitcoin as Collateral is Not a Good Bet, LENDING LAW REPORT
(Jan. 14, 2014), httpsl/www.lendinglawreport.com/2014/O1/articles/collateral/heads-i-win-tails
-you-lose-bitcoin-as-collateral-is-not-a-good-bet/ (discussing the pros and cons of accepting
Bitcoin as collateral); Jon Southurst, Huobi Will Now Take Your Bitcoins as Stock Trading
Collateral,COINDESK (May 5, 2015, 11:05 AM), http://www.coindes k.com/huobi-will-now-take
-your-bitcoins-as-stock-trading-collateral/ (discussing Chinese exchanges that allow customers
to borrow up to 60% of the value of their Bitcoin with the customers' Bitcoin serving as
collateral).
166 See Bitcoin (USD) Price,supra note 39, for the current value of Bitcoin in U.S. dollars.
167 See supra note 41 and accompanying text (discussing the "blanket lien" required of
borrowers by secured lenders).
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To get an enforceable security interest in David's virtual
currency, Carly must comply with Article 9's requirements. The
first challenge is determining how to do this when virtual currency
is not a listed collateral type. Carly must therefore fit virtual
currency into an existing collateral definition (if possible) and rely
on the belief that using the process for that collateral type will
create an enforceable security interest in the virtual currency. If
Carly is wrong, she may not have any collateral to foreclose upon
in the event of a default. Even if Carly had the foresight to take a
security interest in David's other assets, the overall value of the
collateral available to her will be significantly diminished. In
addition, the lack of certainty is likely to impede Carly's ability to
identify and evaluate the status of conflicting security interests in
the virtual currency. On top of the legal uncertainty of proceeding
under Article 9, Carly must account for risks inherent to virtual
David's Bitcoins are
currency, such as its price volatility.
currently at an all-time high price, but it is possible that the value
will decrease over the term of the loan. Furthermore, Bitcoin
transactions are fast, irreversible, and difficult to track because no
personally identifiable information is associated with the
transaction. 168 As such, Carly may have an extremely difficult
time trying to prevent unauthorized transfers or recovering those
Bitcoins after such a transfer, especially if, for example, David
gifts or otherwise disposes of his Bitcoin.
Now consider an established retailer that has several shops
located across the country and a popular online store. The retailer
wishes to obtain a line of credit from a bank. The bank agrees but
wants collateral to secure the retailer's payment obligation. The
bank has a practice of taking a blanket security interest in all
assets, after-acquired assets, and proceeds. This reduces the risk
of nonpayment because it provides the bank with the most
collateral possible to satisfy the debt if the retailer defaults. The
retailer does not initially accept Bitcoin from customers as
payment but starts to do so six months after obtaining the line of
credit from the bank. The retailer, like many, does not hold the

168 See Martinson & Masterson, supra note 165 (stating that it is difficult for creditors to
discover who is conducting transactions because "users remain anonymous and transactions
are irreversible").
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Bitcoin for long; rather it exchanges the Bitcoin for U.S. dollars or
uses it to acquire things for the shops.
The bank now finds itself dealing with virtual currency. The
blanket security interest covers virtual currency at the onset.
However, it was not truly implicated until the retailer started
accepting Bitcoin payments. At this point, the bank's security
interest would cover virtual currency as an after-acquired asset.
In addition, the bank (having a security interest in all the assets of
the retailer) would have had a security interest in the inventory
sold by the retailer to its customers. Thus, a security interest in
the virtual currency may also arise as proceeds of the original
collateral. Additionally, the retailer's exchange of virtual currency
for U.S. bollars or other property raises the issue of the bank's
right to these items as proceeds of the virtual currency. So, just
like Carly in the first example, the bank must now abide by Article
9 to ensure that it has an enforceable security interest in the
virtual currency and its proceeds. If not, the bank will have fewer
assets to pursue if the retailer defaults.
Finally, consider the purchase and sale of a business. Assume
that the business holds virtual currency, which it receives as
payment for its goods and services. The purchaser agrees to pay
part of the purchase price at closing and executes a promissory
note for the remainder. To mitigate the risk of nonpayment, the
seller demands a security interest over the assets of the business,
including the virtual currency. In addition, the buyer requires a
personal guarantee from the purchaser, including a security
interest over the purchaser's personal property, which includes
virtual currency. Again, ensuring an enforceable security interest
requires properly attaching and perfecting a security interest in
169
the virtual currency collateral.
These examples show how virtual currency has infiltrated
secured transactions and why it is now a consideration for all
creditors. Even if a creditor does not affirmatively decide to accept
virtual currency as collateral, virtual currency may nevertheless
affect their security interests and decision-making.

169 See infra Part IV (explaining that, although attachment creates an enforceable security
interest, secured creditors must perfect a security interest in order to improve its
effectiveness).
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B. BENEFITS AND CHALLENGES OF VIRTUAL CURRENCY COLLATERAL

As demonstrated in Part III.A, virtual currency has value as a
type of collateral, but it also presents real challenges. The value of
virtual currency as collateral rest primarily in its monetary value.
Creditors looking to maximize collateral value will want to include
it within the grant of a security interest, likely as part of a larger
collateral package.
Even so, the unique attributes of virtual currency may
negatively impact its value as collateral. Price volatility may
result in a material decrease (or increase) in the value of the
collateral at the time of default. 170 The irreversibility of Bitcoin
172
transactions 71 and the pseudo-anonymous nature of the system
may make it difficult or impossible for secured creditors to identify
and recover an unauthorized transfer or use of Bitcoin collateral
by the debtor. In addition, the failure or closure of Bitcoin
exchanges and the possibility of cyberattacks could result in the
loss of Bitcoin collateral maintained by a third-party. 73 Creditors
must consider each of these factors in determining the appropriate
amount of collateral.
Despite the potential problems, interest in virtual currency as
collateral is growing. Although the risks may counsel against
accepting Bitcoin as the sole source of collateral, Bitcoin's
monetary value is undeniably attractive to secured lenders and
creditors who may want rights to foreclose on virtual currency
along with the other assets of a defaulting debtor.
The final challenge then is uncertainty regarding the
application of Article 9 of the UCC, which governs the attachment,
perfection, and enforcement of security interests in personal
property, to virtual currency. Article 9 was not drafted with
virtual currency in mind, and it has not yet been tailored in any

170 See Martinson & Masterson, supra note 165 (observing that the "extreme volatility of
value" is a cause for concern).
171 See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
172 See supra note 73 and accompanying text (defining "pseudo-anonymous" in the context
of virtual currencies).
173 See Young, supra note 161 (noting that the failure of the largest Bitcoin exchange
resulted in losses of more than $400 million for its customers).
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way to specifically accommodate virtual currency. 174 Because
there is no mention of virtual currency in Article 9, the
appropriate process for obtaining an enforceable security interest
is somewhat unclear.
Moreover, that process has not been
optimized to provide an effective and efficient process that meets
the needs of those dealing with virtual currency collateral. This
creates a real problem for creditors, who cherish having a clear
and unambiguous right to collateral.
IV. VIRTUAL CURRENCY UNDER ARTICLE 9

As discussed above, Article 9 does not explicitly mention virtual
currency, and it has not been modified to account for the advent of
virtual currency as collateral. 175 This Part examines how virtual
currency fits into the existing provisions of Article 9, specifically
the process for obtaining an enforceable security interest in virtual
currency and the implications for secured creditors.
To the extent that virtual currency falls within one of the
broadly defined categories of personal property collateral currently
in Article 9, there is a path forward. Fortunately, Article 9
contains a residual catch-all category of collateral for "general

174 See Reno F.R. Fernandez III, Can Bitcoin be Used as Collateral to Secure a Loan?, BAR
ASS'N OF S.F.: LEGAL BY THE BAY (June 30, 2014), http:/Iblog.sfbar.org/2014/06/30/can-bitcoin-b
e-used-as-collateral-to-secure-a-loanJ (noting that Article 9 does not clearly provide a way for
lenders to perfect a security interest in Bitcoin); Jeffrey I. Snyder, Secured Lender Protection
Limited When Bitcoin is Collateral,NATAL L. REV. (June 19, 2014), http://www.natlawreview.
com/article/secured-lender-protection-limited-when-bitcoin-collateral
(noting that Article 9
"does not provide a simple mechanism for a lender to protect its interest in Bitcoin collateral").
175 Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code was substantially revised in 1998. The
revision expanded the scope of property in which a security interest can be taken by a creditor
under Article 9 by adding several collateral types. Subsequently, Article 9 was amended in
2010. The most significant changes in the 2010 amendment relate to clarifying the debtor
name to be provided on a financing statement. Both the revision and the amendments
occurred prior to the emergence of virtual currency and therefore neither expressly mentions
it. See UCC Article 9 Amendments Summary, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION, http://www.uniform
laws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=UCC%20Article%209%2OAmendments%20(2010) (last
visited Oct. 29, 2017) (noting that the most significant changes in the 2010 amendments to
Article 9 related to clarifying the debtor name to be provided on a financing statement); UCC
Article 9, Secured Transactions (1998) Summary, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION, http://www.unifor
mlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=UCC%20Article%/209,%20Secured%20Transactions%20(1
998) (last visited Oct. 29, 2017) (noting that the 1999 revision of UCC Article 9 expanded the
scope of property in which a security interest can be taken by a creditor by adding several
allowable collateral types).
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intangibles." 176 At present the consensus is that virtual currency
falls within this collateral type. 177 As such, the well-established
rules governing attachment, perfection, and priority over general
intangibles also applies to virtual currency. 178 Article 9, therefore,
appears to provide a workable solution. However, as I discuss
below, simply accommodating virtual currency collateral may not
be enough if that process does not address the unique problems
that are posed by virtual currency collateral. To that end, Article
9 may fail to provide a system that is optimized for virtual
currency collateral, leaving secured creditors to develop private
means of dealing with these problems.
A. COLLATERAL TYPE

Properly categorizing personal property collateral dictates the
means by which a creditor can attach an enforceable security
interest 79 and establish its relative priority as compared to
Article 9 contains a list of defined
competing creditors.1 80
collateral types that encompasses both tangible and intangible
personal property.1 8 1 Although there is.no reference to virtual
currency in Article 9, the "general intangible" collateral type is
broad enough to encompass it. Article 9 defines the term as

follows:

176 U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(42) (AM. LAW INST. & NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE
LAWS 2017).
177 George K. Fogg, The UCC and Bitcoins: Solution to Existing Fatal Flaw, Banking Rep.
(BNA) 104 BBR 15, at 742 (Apr. 14, 2015) ('Under the'current Bitcoin ecosystem, bitcoins
are 'general intangibles'-the UCC's catchall type of Collateral. If a business has a secured
line of credit with a financial institution, it would be highly unusual for the collateral not to
include general intangibles. Thus, one consequence (whether intended or not) of a common
secured financing transaction is that any bitcoins acquired by the borrower would become
subject to the lender's security interest.").
178

See id.

See U.C.C. § 9-203(0-(i) (AM. LAW INST. & NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF.
STATE LAWS 2017) (stating how attachment rights differ depending on the type of underlying
security interest).
180See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 9-301 to -314, 9-324 to -331.
181 See U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(12) ("'Collateral' means the property subject to a security
interest or agricultural lien. The term includes: (A) proceeds to which a security interest
attaches; (B) accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, and promissory notes that have
been sold; and (C) goods that are the subject of a consignment.').
179
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"General intangible" means any personal property,
including things in action, other than accounts, chattel
paper, commercial tort claims, deposit accounts,
documents, goods, instruments, investment property,
letter-of-credit rights, letters of credit, money, and oil,
gas, or other minerals before extraction. The term
includes payment intangibles and software.18 2
The term "general intangible" essentially serves as a catch-all
collateral type for intangible personal property. Any personal
property that does not constitute one of the other listed collateral
types (e.g., goods, accounts, deposit accounts, and investment
property) is a general intangible for purposes of Article 9.183
Virtual currency does not fit neatly within any of the listed
collateral types and therefore appears to constitute a general
intangible.1 8 4 Many of the excluded collateral types listed in the
definition of "general intangible" are plainly inapplicable.
However, evaluating the applicability of a cross-section of these
excluded collateral types-money, goods, accounts, deposit
accounts, investment property and money-highlights why virtual
currency likely falls within the catch-all definition of "general
intangible." In short, virtual currency simply does not fit under
any of the other defined collateral types.
For purposes of the UCC, "money" is defined as "a medium of
exchange currently authorized or adopted by a domestic or foreign
government."1 8 5 The comments clarify that the definition is not
limited to legal tender.18 6 Rather the test is based on whether the
medium of exchange is sanctioned by the government and
recognized "as a part of the official currency of that
government."1 8 7 Virtual currency is assuredly used as a medium of
U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(42).
See U.C.C. § 9-102 cmt. 5.d (" 'General intangible' is the residual category of personal
property, including things in action, that is not included in the other defined types of
collateral.").
184 See id. (providing examples of a "general intangible," including "intellectual property
and the right to payment of a loan of funds that is not evidenced by chattel paper or an
instrument").
185 U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(24).
186 U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(24) cmt. 24 ('The narrow view that money is limited to legal tender is
repeated.").
182
183

187

Id.
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exchange.18 8 In fact, one of its most common uses is as a method of
payment for goods and services.1 8 9 However, the regulation of
virtual currency use does not make it a part of the official currency
of the United States. Thus, the virtual currency is not "money"
under the UCC.
"Goods" are defined in the UCC as "all things that are movable
190 It is essentially an umbrella
when a security interest attaches."
term that covers all types of tangible personal property more
specifically defined in Article 9. Virtual currency is outside the
scope of the definition because it is not moveable. Unlike tangible
personal property, virtual currency is created and stored
electronically.1 91 It is digital and has no physical manifestation.192
Owners access, manage, and use their virtual currency with digital
keys.1 9 3 Digital keys can be stored independently on a personal
(a
computer (a desktop wallet), dedicated hardware device 194
wallet).
paper
(a
codes
QR
printed
hardware wallet), or
Alternatively, owners may use a third-party service such as an
online wallet (where the digital keys are stored on a third party's
computer and connected to the Internet) or a mobile wallet (where
195
a smartphone app facilitates access and use to virtual currency).
Even though virtual currency is stored in a physical form of sorts,
because access is facilitated by tangible goods such as a computer
or a smartphone, virtual currency does not constitute a "good"
under Article 9 because the definition expressly excludes "a
computer program embedded in goods that consist solely of the
1 96
medium in which the program is embedded.

188 See James Surowiecki, Cryptocurrency: The Bitcoin, A Virtual Medium of Exchange,
Could Be a Real Alternative to Government-Issued Money-But Only IfIt Survives Hoarding
4
by Speculators, MIT TECH. REV. (Aug. 23, 2011), http://www.technologyreview.com/review/
25142/cryptocurrency/ (discussing in 2011 the use of Bitcoin as a medium of exchange).
189 See supra notes 11-16 and accompanying text (discussing mainstream companies'
acceptance of Bitcoin as an alternative method to pay for goods and services).
19 U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(44).
191 See What is Bitcoin?, CoiNDESK (Mar. 20, 2015), http://www.coindesk.com/informatio
nwhat-is-bitcoin.
192 See id. ("[B]itcoin is created digitally, by a community of people that anyone can join.").
193 See How to Store Your Bitcoins, COINDESK (Oct. 19, 2015), http://www.coindesk.com/inf
ormation/how-to-store-your-bitcoins/ (listing various ways to store and manage Bitcoins).

See id.
See id.
196 U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(44).
19
195
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Since virtual currency does not qualify as a "good," it must be
considered under the various types of intangible collateral.
Virtual currency, however, fails to fit neatly within most of the
intangible collateral types identified by Article 9. For example,
virtual currency does not constitute an "account,"197 a "deposit
account," 198 or "investment property. 19 9
Under Article 9, an "account" is essentially an account
receivable or the right to payment of a monetary obligation for
property sold or services rendered. 200 The owner of Bitcoin is
entitled to access and use the virtual currency (even if stored with
a third-party wallet), but the right to the Bitcoin does not arise
from a monetary obligation owed by the third-party to the Bitcoin
owner. Stated another way, the Bitcoin owner has not sold
property or rendered services to the third-party service provider to
create a right to payment. Accordingly, virtual currency does not
constitute an "account" for purposes of Article 9.
Similarly, the term "deposit account" does not cover virtual
currency because it generally refers to bank accounts. 20 1 Although
virtual currency can be likened to a demand account (e.g., a
checking or savings account) because Bitcoin owners can withdraw
the value of the Bitcoins at any time, Bitcoin wallets are not
maintained by a bank. Instead, Bitcoin wallets are maintained
directly by the owner or by non-bank third parties. 20 2 Thus,
virtual currency does not fit under the "deposit account" category.
Finally, virtual currency does not appear to clearly fall within
the definition of "investment property." Although, owners of
Bitcoin may purchase it with the intent of realizing a return,
Article 9 investment property generally refers to securities,
securities accounts, commodity contracts, commodity accounts,

197 U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(2).

U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(29).
I- U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(49).
200 U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(2) (defining "account" as "a right to payment of a monetary
obligation, whether or not earned by performance").
201 U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(29) (2017) (defining "deposit account" as "a demand, time, savings,
passbook, or similar account maintained with a bank").
202 See Nathaniel Popper, Bitcoin Basics, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2015), https://nyti.ms/2kcBgmu
(explaining that Bitcoins are kept on a ledge that is communally maintained by Bitcoin users
rather than by any central authority like a bank).
198
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and the like. 20 3 Although the courts have started to address the
applicability of federal securities laws to virtual currency, the
question of whether virtual currency is a security is far from
settled. 204 Moreover, virtual currency does not appear to resemble
common types of securities, such as shares of stock, bonds, or
mutual funds.
The foregoing leads to the conclusion that virtual currency is
likely to be treated as a general intangible. Virtual currency is
personal property and it does not fit in the collateral types that are
specifically excluded from the definition. The broadly inclusive
definition appears to cover virtual currency, meaning that the
attachment, perfection, priority, and enforcement of security
interests in virtual currency would be governed by the rules
applicable to general intangibles.
B. ATTACHMENT

To attach an enforceable security interest, Article 9 requires the
satisfaction of three elements: (1) the secured creditor must give
value to the debtor; (2) the debtor must have rights in the
collateral or the power to transfer rights in the collateral to the
secured creditor; and (3) one of the conditions in 9-203(b)(3) must
20 5
be met.
The most common way to satisfy the third element is for the
debtor to authenticate a security agreement that describes the
collateral. 206 However, additional options are available for certain
Specifically, the third element can also be
collateral types.
satisfied by the secured creditor taking: (1) possession of collateral
that constitutes goods, instruments, money, negotiable documents,
or tangible chattel paper; 20 7 (2) control of collateral that constitutes
deposit accounts, electronic chattel paper, investment property, or
letter-of-credit rights;20 8 or (3) delivery of collateral that

U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(49) (defining "investment property" as "a security, whether certificated
or uncertificated, security entitlement, securities account, commodity contract, or commodity
account').
204 See supra Part I.B.l.c (discussing relevant securities law).
205 U.C.C. § 9-203(b).
206 U.C.C. § 9-203(b)(3)(A).
207 U.C.C. § 9-203(b)(3)(B).
208 U.C.C. § 9-203(b)(3)(D).
203
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constitutes certificated securities. 209 Notably, none of these
additional options apply to general intangibles.
If a creditor wishes to attach a security interest in a debtor's
Bitcoin as collateral, the first two elements of attachment are
easily met in most cases. Extending credit or advancing a loan to
the debtor typically establishes that value has been given by the
secured creditor. Additionally, a debtor's ownership of Bitcoin
would constitute sufficient rights to support a grant of a security
interest in it. The options for satisfying the third element of
attachment, however, are more limited with Bitcoin collateral. As
discussed above, Bitcoin constitutes a general intangible for
purposes of Article 9.210 Accordingly, attachment of a security
interest in Bitcoin cannot be completed via possession, control, or
delivery, because general intangibles are not one of the specified
collateral types. 211 Instead, the only way to satisfy the third
element of attachment when dealing with a general intangible
(like Bitcoin) is for the secured creditor to obtain a security
agreement authenticated by the debtor that describes the
collateral. 212 Therefore, Article 9, by treating Bitcoin as a general
intangible, provides a means for creditors to attach a security
interest in Bitcoin collateral, despite the lack of rules specifically
tailored to virtual currency.
C. PERFECTION
Attachment creates an enforceable security interest in the

collateral. 213 However, secured creditors must take additional
steps to perfect a security interest to improve its effectiveness
against competing creditors and other third parties. 214 In short,
perfection of a security interest requires attachment plus the
additional steps required by Article 9.215

U.C.C. § 9-203(b)(3)(C).
See supra Part V.A.
211 See U.C.C. §§ 9-203(b)(3)(A)-(D).
212 U.C.C. § 9-203(b)(3)(A).
213 U.C.C. § 9-203(a).
214 U.C.C. § 9-308 cmt. 2 (" 'Perfected' means that the security interest has attached and
the secured party has taken all the steps required by [Article 9] as specified in Sections 9310 through 9-316.").
2o-

210

215

Id.
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Unless an exception applies, the general rule is that a financing
statement must be filed to perfect a security interest. 2 16 As a result,
the most common way to perfect a security interest is by
attachment and the filing of a financing statement that describes
the collateral. There are some exceptions to the filing requirement.
Perfection can also occur by: (1) attachment and possession of
certain tangible collateral; 217 and (2) attachment and control of
certain intangible collateral. 218 Possession is only effective for
tangible negotiable documents, goods, instruments, money, or
tangible chattel paper. 21 9 Control is only effective if the collateral
constitutes deposit accounts, electronic chattel paper, electronic
documents, investment property, or letter-of-credit rights. 220 Again,
none of the special rules apply to general intangibles.
Article 9's approach to perfection is somewhat reminiscent of its
approach to attachment. Article 9 provides a general rule that is
broadly applicable to all types of personal property collateral, and
supplements the general rule with special rules that only apply to
specific collateral types. As applied to virtual currency, there is
only one viable method of perfection: the filing of a financing
statement that appropriately describes the collateral. 221 Because
virtual currency constitutes a general intangible, the special rules
222
allowing for perfection by possession or control are inapplicable.
D. PRIORITY

As a general matter, Article 9 contains several different rules
that govern the determination of priority amongst each potential
combination of parties that may assert an interest in the same
collateral. A secured creditor has priority over an unsecured

U.C.C. § 9-310(a).
U.C.C. § 9310(b)(2).
218 U.C.C. §§ 9-310(b)(6)-(8).
219 U.C.C. § 9-313(a).
220 U.C.C. § 9-310(b)(8).
221 U.C.C. §§ 9-310(a)-(b).
222 See U.C.C. § 9-310(b); see also In re K-RAM, Inc., 451 B.R. 154, 173 (Bankr. D.N.M.
2011) ("Perfection by possession applies only to tangible negotiable documents, goods,
instruments, money or tangible chattel paper. Perfection by control applies only to
investment property, deposit accounts, letter-of-credit rights, electronic chattel paper and
electronic documents." (citations omitted)).
216
217
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creditor who has not attached a security interest in the collateral. 223
As between two unperfected secured parties, the first to attach a
security interest has priority.224 A perfected secured party has
225
priority over an unperfected secured party Who has only attached.
As between two perfected secured parties, the first to file a
financing statement or to perfect has priority. 226 As between a lien
creditor and a secured party, the secured party has priority if it
perfects before the lien creditor becomes a lien creditor (usually by
levy on the collateral). 227 Accordingly, the rules for determining
priority generally relate to the status of the party asserting an
interest in the collateral and whether that party accomplished
statutorily specified actions before the competing party.
However, Article 9 supplements the general priority rules with
special priority rules that apply only to certain types of collateral
and methods of perfection. Sections 9-327 and 9-328 deal with
priority in the context of collateral perfected by control. Section 9327 provides that a secured creditor with control of a deposit
account has priority over a secured creditor who perfects by any
other means. Section 9-328 provides that a secured creditor with
control of investment property has priority over a secured creditor
who perfects by any other means. Both Sections 9-327 and 9-328
provide rules for determining priority when more than one secured
creditor has control. 228 Special priority rules also exist for certain
types of collateral perfected via possession.229 As such, Article 9
again recognizes that certain types of collateral and methods of
perfection ought to be treated differently. Yet none of these special
priority rules apply to general intangibles, which cannot be
230
perfected via possession or control.
See U.C.C. § 9-317(a).
U.C.C. § 9-322(a)(3).
225 U.C.C. § 9-322(a)(2).
226 U.C.C. § 9-322(a)(1).
227 U.C.C. § 9-317(a).
228 Section 9-327 provides that "security interests perfected by control ... rank according
to priority in time of obtaining control." U.C.C. § 9-327(2). Section 9-328 ranks conflicting
security interests that are held and controlled by secured parties according to the collateral
type. U.C.C. 9-328(2). For example, if the collateral is a security, then the priority is with
the party that first obtained control of the collateral. U.C.C. § 9-328(2)(A).
229 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-330 ("[a] purchaser of chattel paper has priority over a security
interest in the chattel paper" if certain conditions are met).
230 See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 9-327, 9-328, 9-329, 9-330.
223
224
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Having provided for the attachment and perfection of security
interests in virtual currency, Article 9's system of rules governing
priority between competing creditors is also flexible enough to
The general rules governing
accommodate virtual currency.
priority would apply to security interests in virtual currency or in
any other personal property collateral in exactly the same way.
However, special priority rules, such as those giving precedence to
security interests that are perfected by possession or control,
would be inapplicable to virtual currency as a general intangible.
E. BEST PRACTICES AND POTENTIAL PROBLEMS

Article 9's approach to the creation and enforcement of security
interests can be characterized as providing general rules that are
broadly applicable to all personal property collateral. Article 9
then supplements these general rules with additional rules that
are specific to certain collateral types. Article 9, by treating
virtual currency as a general intangible, is sufficiently flexible to
allow for the use of virtual currency as collateral.
If virtual currency is ultimately determined to be a general
intangible, Article 9 provides clear and well-established methods
for attaching and enforcing security interests in virtual currency.
The same basic rules that apply to general intangibles would apply
to virtual currency. These can be summarized as follows:
"
*

*

*

231
232
233

Possession and control do not apply to virtual
231
currency.
Attachment of a security interest in virtual
currency requires, among other things, a security
23 2
agreement that describes the collateral.
Perfection of a security interest in virtual
currency can only be accomplished by filing an
233
effective financing statement.
Priority among competitors asserting an interest
in the same virtual currency is determined by
the general priority rules. Secured creditors

See supranote 230 and accompanying text.
See supranote 212 and accompanying text.
See supranote 221 and accompanying text.
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have priority over unsecured creditors. The first
to attach has priority between two unperfected
secured creditors. A perfected security interest
takes priority over an unperfected security
interest. As between two perfected security
interests, the first to perfect or file a financing
234
statement will have priority.
Despite the seemingly appropriate classification of virtual
currency as a general intangible under the current provisions of
Article 9, those wishing to obtain an enforceable security interest
in virtual currency should take steps to minimize the risk of
misclassification. Classification of virtual currency into another
collateral type is certainly conceivable. As such, it may be prudent
for secured parties to treat virtual currency as potentially falling
into multiple collateral types-for example, general intangibles,
investment property, and money-when evaluating attachment,
perfection, and priority.
Nonetheless, modifications to Article 9 are not necessary to
accommodate the use of virtual currency as collateral. Rather the
existing provisions of Article 9 appear to provide a workable
solution for those wishing to obtain an enforceable security interest
in virtual currency. Moving forward without any modifications to
Article 9 also has some clear benefits. It eliminates the need for a
substantive amendment to the UCC and thus avoids questions
about whether such an amendment would be uniformly adopted by
each state. In addition, by treating virtual currency as a general
intangible, Article 9 applies a familiar process. Familiarity may
lead to increased comfort and certainty for those participating in
secured transactions involving virtual currency. Since the same old
rules apply, there is nothing new to consider.
Nonetheless, the failure to optimize Article 9 for the unique
characteristics of virtual currency collateral may create some
issues for secured creditors. First, the term "general intangible"
may make it more difficult to identify and give notice of a security
interest in virtual currency. Since Article 9 does not treat virtual
currency as a separate collateral type, security agreements and

284 See supra Part IV.D.
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financing statements may cover virtual currency collateral without
expressly mentioning it. With that in mind, secured creditors
should consider using more specific descriptions of virtual
currency collateral to more effectively communicate the scope of a
security interest. Moreover, secured creditors must recognize that
a security interest over general intangibles may include virtual
currency. This means that further investigation may be necessary
to discern the true scope of such a security interest.
Second, simply attaching and perfecting a security interest in
virtual currency does not prevent a debtor from using or otherwise
disposing of virtual currency collateral in violation of the terms of
a security agreement. 235 If this occurs, the pseudo-anonymous
nature and irreversibility of virtual currency transactions may
make it difficult-if not impossible-to recover. To protect against
loss of collateral, secured creditors cannot rely solely on a security
agreement and filing of a financing statement. Instead, secured
creditors must find another way of preventing a debtor from
accessing or using virtual currency collateral. For example, a
secured creditor could require that a debtor turn over control of
the virtual currency via transfer of virtual currency collateral to a
wallet controlled by the secured creditor or delivery of the debtor's
236
desktop wallet, hardware wallet, or paper wallet.
Third, simply attaching and perfecting a security interest in
virtual currency collateral does not prevent a debtor from further
encumbering it. A debtor may grant a security interest in the
same collateral to any number of additional creditors. 237 Even if
the security agreement makes such an encumbrance a default,
The secured creditor may need to
vigilance is required.
periodically search for filed financing statements to discover an
unauthorized encumbrance.
These issues are not insurmountable. A secured creditor could
easily manage the process by turning to methods outside of Article
9 to mitigate the risk. For example, the creditor could charge a

235 See U.C.C. § 9-315(a) (providing for security interests to continue upon unauthorized
transfers of collateral).
236 For definitions and examples of virtual currency storage devices, see supra notes 19495 and accompanying text.
237 Cf. U.C.C. § 9-322 (discussing priority among conflicting security interests in the same

collateral).
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higher interest rate, require additional collateral, or rely on
contractual covenants or other methods to prevent unauthorized
transfers. But, as discussed below, amending Article 9 is another
option. To be clear, engaging in secured transactions is not risk
free for a secured creditor, nor should it be. The issues discussed
above are not absent with other types of collateral. However, the
unique characteristics of virtual currency may pose heightened
risks inconsistent with how Article 9 treats other collateral types.
Ultimately, the continuing normalization of virtual currency use
may justify a more tailored approach.
V. OPTIMIZING ARTICLE 9 FOR VIRTUAL CURRENCY

In this Part, I address how the process of obtaining and
enforcing security interests in virtual currency might be improved
by amending Article 9. I suggest that Article 9 could adopt virtual
currency as a distinct collateral type and extend the concept of
control to virtual currency collateral. With these modest changes,
Article 9 could be tailored to virtual currency collateral and
address the issues facing secured creditors under the current
system.
Moreover, the changes would have the benefit of
leveraging the existing framework for control of intangible
collateral, such as deposit accounts and investment property,
which has long been a part of Article 9.
In Part V.A, I consider the basis for virtual currency as a newly
defined collateral type. Part V.B continues by examining the
justification for extending control to virtual currency collateral. In
Part V.C, I set forth a proposal for integrating control of virtual
currency collateral into Article 9, and I briefly discuss how such
integration creates a more effective process for obtaining and
enforcing security interests in virtual currency.
A. VIRTUAL CURRENCY AS A NEW COLLATERAL TYPE

By incorporating virtual currency into the collateral category of
"general intangible," Article 9 does not currently allow for the
rules governing attachment, perfection, and priority to be tailored
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Virtual currency must,
specifically to virtual currency. 238
therefore, be treated like all other general intangibles for purposes
of Article 9.239 However, virtual currency differs in many respects
from the other types of personal property that are viewed as
Instead, virtual currency resembles and
general intangibles.
a variety of other types of collateral
with
shares characteristics
that are separately defined in Article 9.
The breadth of the term "general intangible" is highlighted by
the fact that it is a residual category that is defined broadly
enough to encompass all personal property not otherwise covered
by Article 9. That is to say, a general intangible is any personal
property other than assets that fall within the listed collateral
types defined by Article 9.240 Because a general intangible is
defined primarily in the negative-specifying what is not
included-ascertaining what is included can be difficult.
Examples are useful to highlight both the breadth and the
nature of personal property that commonly falls within the
definition. The term has been found to include: (1) intellectual
property (e.g., copyrights, patents and trademarks); 24 1 (2) licenses
and permits (e.g., federal governments licenses, 242 liquor
licenses, 243 state water permits, 244 and intellectual property
licenses 245); (3) trade secrets and other compiled information, such

238 See supra Part IV (explaining how virtual currency does not fit into any category other
than "general intangibles" and therefore receives the same treatment as other members of
that category).
239 See supra Part IV.
240 See U.C.C. § 9-102 cmt. 5.d ("'General intangible' is the residual category of personal
property, including things in action, that is not included in the other defined types of
collateral."); see also 8 WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND ET AL., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES § 9106:3 (Frederick H. Miller ed., 2017) ("[The] residual category, general intangibles, [is) defined
broadly enough to include all personal property not otherwise covered by the Code.").
241 See U.S. Test, Inc. v. NDE Envtl. Corp., 196 F.3d 1376, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
("[I]ntellectual property, e.g., a patent, is within the definition of 'general intangible'....").
242 See, e.g., State St. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Arrow Commc'ns, Inc., 833 F. Supp. 41, 48 (D.
Mass. 1993) (holding that a governmental license is a general intangible).
243 See, e.g., Rushmore State Bank v. Kurylas, Inc., 424 N.W.2d 649, 654 (S.D. 1988)
(holding that a liquor license is a general intangible).
244 See, e.g., Lake Region Credit Union v. Crystal Pure Water, Inc., 502 N.W.2d 524, 528
(N.D. 1993) (holding that a state water permit is a general intangible).
245 See, e.g., In re Specialty Foods of Pittsburgh, Inc., 98 B.R. 734, 736 (Bankr. W.D. Pa.
1989) (holding that a license to use trademark may be a general intangible).
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as plans, specifications, or blueprints; 246 (4) rights to payment
other than for goods sold or services rendered (e.g., rights to
unearned premiums, 247 refunds or returns, 248 funds in escrow, 249
and funds earned after prevailing in arbitration 250); and (5) a
variety of other intangible property rights that do not include the
payment of money (e.g., rights in patent applications, 25 ' rights to
stocks or bonds prior to their issuance, 25 2 partnership interests, 253
and franchise rights 254). These examples demonstrate that the
term "general intangible" encompasses a wide range of intangible
property rights, including contract rights; rights to the payment of
money (so long as they do not constitute another type of collateral
defined by Article 9); rights to performance; and rights to the use
of property.
In contrast to the types of property rights that are typically
classified as general intangibles, virtual currency is most
commonly used as a medium of exchange 255 or a digital method of
paying for goods and services. 256 As such, virtual currency is

246 See HAWKLAND ET AL., supra note 240, § 9-106:3 (stating that trade secrets and other
compiled information can carry value and, therefore, can serve as intangible collateral).
247 See, e.g., In re Megamarket of Lexington, Inc., 2007 B.R. 527, 533 (Bankr. E.D. Ky.
1997) (holding that an unearned insurance premium is a general intangible).
248 See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Litchfield v. O'Neil (In re Litchfield Constr. Mgmt., Inc.),
137 B.R. 98, 100 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1992) (holding that a right to the return of a cash bond is
a general intangible); In re Am. Home Furnishings Corp., 48 B.R. 905, 908 (Bankr. W.D.
Wash. 1985) (holding that tax refunds are general intangibles).
249 See, e.g., Vienna Park Props. v. United Postal Savs. Ass'n (In re Vienna Park Props.),
976 F.2d 106, 117 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that a contractual right to receive funds remaining
in escrow is a general intangible).
250 See, e.g., Farmers State Bank of Almelund v. Graham, No. C6-91-2282, 1992 WL
95872, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. May 12, 1992) (holding that a right to money from an
arbitration award is a general intangible).
251 See, e.g., Holt v. United States, No. 1976-72, 1973 WL 614, at *2 (D.D.C. Aug. 23, 1973)
("[A] patent application is within the definition of 'general intangible' .... ).
252 See, e.g., Nelson v. Cavalier Rural Elec. Coop. of Langdon (In re Axvig), 68 B.R. 910,
917 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1987) (describing "[a] members' capital reserve account or capital stock
in a cooperative" as "in the nature of a general intangible").
253 See, e.g., Trapp v. Hancuh, 530 N.W.2d 879, 887 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that a
partnership interest is a general intangible).
254 See, e.g., T.S. Note Co. v. United Kansas Bank & Tr. (In re Topsy's Shoppes, Inc.), 131
B.R. 886, 889 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1991) (finding that "franchise rights... are covered by the
term 'general intangibles' ").
255 See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
256 See supra notes 11-16 and accompanying text (discussing mainstream companies'
acceptance of Bitcoin as an alternative method to pay for goods and services).
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perhaps more akin to money 257 or a deposit account, 258 which are
both separate and distinct collateral types defined by the UCC.
Like money, virtual currency has value and can be used to
purchase goods or services. 259 In addition, both money and virtual
currency can be held directly or accessed using "demand" accounts
maintained by third parties. 260 While money is most often stored
in deposit accounts (e.g., checking or savings accounts) maintained
by a bank or financial institution, virtual currency can be held in a
mobile or web-based wallet operated by a third-party service
261
provider.
Virtual currency, however, differs from money and deposit
accounts in several respects. Unlike money, virtual currency
generally has no physical or tangible manifestation. 262 In addition,
unlike money, virtual currency is not legal tender backed by a
government or central bank. 263 Finally, unlike deposit accounts,
the third-party service providers operating Bitcoin wallets are not
banks or financial institutions. 264 So, virtual currency clearly falls
outside of the definitions of money and deposit accounts.
Nonetheless, virtual currency resembles these collateral types,
both of which are separately defined by Article 9 and explicitly
excluded from the residual category, "general intangibles."

267 See supra notes 185-87 and accompanying text (discussing the term "money" as
defined in the UCC).
258 See supra notes 201-02 and accompanying text (discussing the UCC's definition of
"deposit account" in the context of virtual currency).
259 See GAO REPORT, supra note 152, at 4 (discussing the various functions of virtual
currency, including its use as a medium of exchange to purchase goods and services); Joshua
J. Doguet, The Nature of the Form: Legal and Regulatory Issues Surrounding the Bitcoin
Digital Currency System, 73 LA. L. REV. 1119, 1119-20 (2013) (arguing that Bitcoin is "not
very different from established fiat currencies" in that its value fluctuates in relation to other
currencies and it can be spent anywhere that is willing to accept it as a medium of exchange).
260 See supra notes 184-202 and accompanying text (comparing Bitcoin accounts/wallets
with traditional demand accounts).
261 See Young, supra note 161 ("[Ihe electronic wallet provider.. . holds the virtual
currency on behalf of its owner.').
262 See BRITO & CASTILLO, supra note 6, at 35 ("[B]itcoins are unlike traditional
commodities such as gold, corn, or oil, which are tangible and have intrinsically valuable
uses."). But see How to Make a PaperBitcoin Wallet, CoINDESK, https://www.coindesk.coml
informationlpaper-wallet-tutoriall (last visited Oct. 31, 2017) (describing "paper wallets"
and the process for transferring digital coins into physical (paper) form).
263 See Doguet, supra note 259, at 1119.
264 See Tu & Meredith, supra note 7, at 332-33 (describing the role third parties play in

Bitcoin exchanges).
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Virtual currency is also commonly viewed as an investment. As
such, it is conceptually similar to different types of traditional
investments that fall within Article 9's definition of investment
property. 265 People invest in virtual currency just like they invest
in stocks and commodities. 266 So again, virtual currency resembles
a type of collateral-investment property-that is separately
defined by Article 9.
Based on the foregoing, it may not be appropriate to relegate
virtual currency to the residual category of general intangibles.
Article 9 plainly rejects a one-size-fits-all approach to secured
transactions. Indeed, it recognizes a long list of distinct collateral
types that exist separately from the "general intangibles" catchall, 2 67 allowing for the operative provisions of Article 9 to be
tailored in ways that make sense for each type of collateral. This
is evidenced by the provisions of Article 9 that only apply to
certain types of collateral. 268 Therefore, the addition of a definition
for virtual currency, either held directly by the debtor or
maintained by a third-party intermediary, is a threshold
requirement. Article 9 can only develop and implement rules
specific to virtual currency collateral if it exists separately from
other types of general intangibles.
Pulling virtual currency out of the general intangibles category
can be accomplished in a variety of ways.
However, three
possibilities appear to be the most fitting: (1) expanding the
definition of "money" to include virtual currency; (2) expanding the
definition of "investment property" to include virtual currency; or
(3) creating a newly defined collateral type for virtual currency. Of
these, I contend that a new definition is the best option.

265

See U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(49) (AM. LAW INST. & NAT L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF.

STATE LAWS 2017) (" 'Investment property' means a security, whether

certificated or
uncertificated, security entitlement, securities account, commodity contract, or commodity
account.").
266 See Jonnelle Marte, Why People Are Going Crazy Over Bitcoin and Other Digital
Currencies, WASH. POST (June 14, 2017), http://wapo.st/2sOGCYS (noting that the return on
investment for Bitcoin surpassed the returns seen in stocks, bonds, and most other
investments in early 2017).
267 See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 9-102(a)(2), (6), (11), (13), (29), (33)-(34), (42), (47)-(49), (51), (61)
(indicating thirteen collateral types other than general intangibles).
268 See, for example, U.C.C. §§ 9-327, 9-328. These sections of Article 9 are discussed in
detail in Part IV.D, supra.

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2018

57

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 52, No. 2 [2018], Art. 4

562

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:505

Expansion of the existing definitions would align virtual
currency collateral with its two most common uses: virtual
currency's use as a medium of exchange and as investment
property. As such, it is certainly a sensible approach. Of the two
existing definitions, investment property presents fewer structural
For example, the UCC's definition of money
challenges.
contemplates tangible collateral capable of being physically
possessed. 269 Since virtual currency is an intangible, the UCC
provisions relating to possession of money would be unworkable in
the context of virtual currency. Furthermore, expanding the
definition of money fails to recognize that virtual currency is not
"money" in the traditional sense. Instead, it is something new and
distinct, based on innovative blockchain technology. As such, it
functions in a way that is currently impossible for money to
replicate.
It is not surprising, then, that some have already suggested
that changing virtual currency from general intangibles to
investment property under the UCC is the solution. 270 Since
virtual currency is an intangible, the definition of investment
property is more fitting. It allows for treatment of virtual currency
like securities accounts and other financial assets under Article 9
and Article 8, which, among other things, allows for the relatively
seamless extension of provisions regarding control of intangible
27 1
collateral.
Despite the support for defining virtual currency as a type of
investment property, I suggest that treating it as a distinct
collateral type is preferable. As discussed below, defining virtual
currency as a distinct collateral type does not foreclose the
extension of the UCC's existing provisions regarding control.
Accordingly, this proposal provides the same substantive benefits
that would exist by rolling virtual currency into the definition of
investment property. Moreover, keeping virtual currency as a
separate type of collateral allows for a broader framework that
clearly encompasses different uses of virtual currency (not just
See U.C.C. § 9-313(a) (listing money among several other tangible types of collateral).
See, e.g., Fogg, supra note 177, at 744 (arguing that "changing the Article 9 collateral
type of bitcoins from general intangibles to investment property" will eliminate the flaws in
Article 9 as it relates to virtual currency).
271 See id.
269
270

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol52/iss2/4

58

Tu: Perfecting Bitcoin
2018]

PERFECTINGBITCOIN

563

investment related) and new types of virtual currency that may
arise in the future.
B. CONTROL OF VIRTUAL CURRENCY

Creating a new category of collateral for virtual currency under
Article 9 opens the door to rules specific to virtual currency.
Optimizing Article 9 for virtual currency collateral does not,
however, require an overhaul of attachment, perfection, and
priority. I argue that Article 9 already has the foundation in place.
The well-established concepts of possession and control over
collateral can easily be extended to cover virtual currency. Since
virtual currency is an intangible, control is the most logical
starting point.
Under Article 9, the way a secured creditor establishes control
differs depending on the type of collateral involved. For example,
a secured creditor may achieve control of a deposit account in one
of three ways. First, a secured party that is the bank where the
debtor maintains a deposit account is deemed to have control of
that deposit account. 272 Second, if the secured party is not the
bank where the debtor maintains the deposit account, the secured
creditor can enter into a Deposit Account Control Agreement with
the debtor and the bank. 273 The Deposit Account Control
Agreement must be evidenced by an authenticated record that
obligates the bank to comply with the secured party's instructions
regarding the disposition of funds in the deposit account without
further consent from the debtor. 274 Third, the secured party can
become a customer of the bank with respect to the deposit
account. 275 To do so, the deposit account must typically be placed
in the name of the secured party, which may preclude the debtor
from accessing or using funds in the deposit account. Hence,
control of a deposit account generally involves the secured party
having or obtaining rights to access or dispose of funds in a deposit
account to the exclusion of the debtor.

272U.C.C. § 9-104(a)(1).
273 U.C.C. § 9-104(a)(2).
274 Id.
275U.C.C. § 9-104(a)(3).
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The methods of control over investment property vary
2 76 When an
depending on the type of investment property at issue.
equity interest is represented by an official instrument (commonly
a stock certificate), a secured creditor can obtain control by taking
277
Delivery requires the
delivery of the certificated security.
certificate or a third
the
secured party to obtain possession of
party to obtain possession of the certificate on behalf of the
secured party.2 7 8 If the certificate is transferable by the bearer of
the certificate without need for any indorsement, then control is
obtained by delivery alone. 279 In contrast, if the certificate
specifies the person entitled to the certificate, and transfer may be
registered on the issuer's books, then the process of obtaining
280
The certificate must be
control requires additional steps.
properly indorsed to the secured party by the person named on the
certificate, or registered in the name of the secured party by the
issuer. 28 1 By obtaining control in one of these ways, the secured
party effectively obtains the rights of the debtor as the owner of
the collateral. Control, therefore, essentially requires that the
secured party obtain rights over the collateral to the exclusion of
the debtor.
Other types of investment property differ from certificated
securities because they are not represented by a tangible
instrument capable of possession. For example, a debtor may have
rights in uncertificated securities-an equity interest that is not
represented by an instrument but is instead registered on the
issuer's books. 28 2 Or the debtor may have rights in securities
entitlements-indirect rights to securities held on behalf of the
28 3 A secured
debtor by a securities intermediary such as a broker.
party can obtain control of uncertificated securities by becoming
28 4 or by
the registered owner of the security on the issuer's books,
the issuer agreeing to comply with the secured party's instructions

277

See U.C.C. §§ 9-106(a), 8-106.
U.C.C. § 8-106(a)-(b).

278

U.C.C. § 8-301.

276

U.C.C. §§ 8-102(a)(2), 8-106(a).
U.C.C. §§ 8-102(a)(13), 8-106(b).
-1 U.C.C. § 8-106(b).
282 U.C.C. § 8-102(a)(8).
283 U.C.C. §§ 8-102(a)(7), (14), (17), 9-102 cmt. 6.
- U.C.C. §§ 8-106(c)(1), 8-301(b)(1).

279

2-
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without the need for further consent from the registered owner of
the security. 28 5 Similarly, a secured party can obtain control of
securities entitlements by becoming the entitlement holder
identified in the securities intermediary's records, 28 6 or by the
securities intermediary agreeing to comply with the secured
party's instructions without further consent from the entitlement
holder. 28 7 Despite the varying methods of obtaining control, the
crux of the process again generally involves the secured party
lawfully obtaining rights, including the ability to direct or
otherwise exercise dominion over the collateral, to the exclusion of
the debtor.
Turning to virtual currency, the UCC's concept of control over
certain types of intangible collateral could be extended to
encompass virtual currency collateral.
Like other types of
intangible collateral, virtual currency is not generally capable of
physical possession. However, a secured party could evidence
control of a debtor's virtual currency by obtaining the rights to the
exclusion of the debtor in several ways. In considering potential
methods of control for virtual currency, the differing methods of
control over deposit accounts and investment property are
instructive.
As discussed above, virtual currency-or, more accurately, the
digital keys that allow a person to access and use virtual
currency--can be held directly by the owner in a desktop wallet,
hardware wallet, or paper wallet. 288 Where virtual currency is
held directly by a debtor in one of these types of wallets, several
options for control appear worthy of consideration. For example, a
secured party could potentially establish control by taking delivery
or physical possession of the debtor's wallet. In doing so, control of
virtual currency could be likened to control of a certificated
security in bearer form.
By holding the wallet, the secured party would have the digital
keys necessary to access and direct the use of the debtor's virtual
currency. On its face, this would appear to give the secured party
rights sufficient to establish control. However, the level of control
285 U.C.C. § 8-106(c)(2).

U.C.C. § 8-106(d)(1).
U.C.C. § 8-106(d)(2).
288 See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
286

287
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may ultimately fall short. Securities in bearer form are traded
without any record of ownership, and possession of the stock
28 9 As such, a
certificate acts as the only evidence of ownership.
secured party that holds a certificated security in bearer form is
considered the owner of the security, and the debtor who gives up
290
In
possession effectively relinquishes ownership rights.
contrast, possession of a desktop wallet, hardware wallet, or paper
wallet may not provide the secured party with ownership rights to
the exclusion of the debtor. As a practical matter, because the
debtor would retain knowledge or a copy of the digital key, the
debtor could retain the ability to access the virtual currency,
291 As
despite the secured party's possession of the debtor's wallet.
such, the secured party and the debtor would each independently
hold the power to direct the virtual currency collateral.
Because of this, an alternative method may more effectively
provide the requisite level of control. In lieu of taking possession
of the debtor's wallet, the secured party could establish control by
having the debtor transfer the virtual currency to the secured
party's wallet so that only someone with the secured party's digital
key could access the collateral. The secured party would then
enjoy greater dominion over the virtual currency, while also
preventing the debtor from accessing or using the collateral.
Moreover, the transfer of virtual currency to the secured party's
wallet would address another practical concern that may make
possession of the debtor's wallet impracticable. While a debtor
may be willing to relinquish possession of a hardware wallet or
paper wallet, it may not be feasible for a debtor using a desktop
wallet to give up possession of their personal computer. Therefore,
control over virtual currency held directly by a debtor could be
established in several ways, but the transfer of virtual currency to
the secured party appears to better address the practical realities
of virtual currency collateral while also establishing a level of
See Michael Quint, Elements in Bearer Bonds, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 1984), http://www.
nytimes.com/1984/08/14/business/elements-in-bearer-bond-issue.htnil (explaining the nature
of bearer bonds).
290 See id. (explaining that a bearer bond is the property of its holder); see also U.C.C. § 3109 (defining the term "payable to bearer" as indicating that the person in possession is
entitled to payment).
291 See Young, supra note 161 (discussing the challenges in limiting a borrower's access to
his virtual wallet).
289
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dominion over the collateral that is consistent with control of other
collateral types under the UCC.
As an alternative to directly holding virtual currency, owners
may elect to use an online or mobile wallet operated by a thirdparty service provider to manage their virtual currency. 292 To
establish control of virtual currency held in this way, a secured
party could seek the debtor's agreement to transfer the virtual
currency to the secured party's own wallet. In this case, the
transfer of the virtual currency to the secured party's wallet would
appear to evidence sufficient control for purposes of Article 9.
However, the presence of a third party could, in some cases,
allow for an alternative method of control that is already
supported by Article 9 with respect to deposit accounts and
securities entitlements. Like deposit accounts maintained by a
bank or a securities entitlement held by broker, a debtor can elect
to access and manage their virtual currency through a third party
such as Coinbase, an integrated wallet/exchange. 293 Where a
debtor's virtual currency is held in this way, control could
potentially be established by the secured party obtaining an
authenticated agreement obligating the third party to comply with
the secured party's instructions regarding the virtual currency
without further consent from the debtor. Like control of deposit
accounts 294 and securities entitlements, 295 this would require that
the debtor, secured party, and third party maintaining the virtual
currency on behalf of the debtor (e.g., Coinbase) agree to abide by
the secured party's directives with respect to the virtual currency
collateral. Because the debtor's consent is no longer necessary, the
secured party would have the requisite power over the collateral to
292 See supra notes 194-95 and accompanying text (discussing third-party services for
storing virtual currency, including online and mobile wallets).
293 See COINBASE, https://www.coinbase.com (last visited Oct. 31, 2017) (explaining that
Coinbase is a service that allows users to "securely store digital currency" by creating a
digital wallet).
294

See U.C.C. § 9-104(a)(2) (AM. LAW INST. & NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF.

STATE LAWS 2017) (providing for control of a deposit account by the secured party once "the
debtor, secured party, and bank have agreed in an authenticated record that the bank will
comply with instructions originated by the secured party directing disposition of the funds
in the deposit account without further consent by the debtor").
295 See U.C.C. § 8-106(d)(2) (providing that "[a] purchaser has control of a security
entitlement if the securities intermediary has agreed that it will comply with entitlement
orders originated by the purchaser without further consent by the entitlement holder').
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establish control. Moreover, a secured party that obtains such an
agreement would seemingly have an equivalent level of control
over the debtor's virtual currency as compared to a secured party
with control over a deposit account or securities entitlement,
making control of virtual currency consistent with control of other
types of intangible collateral.
In sum, the concept of control over certain types of intangible
collateral is well established. Virtual currency resembles the types
of collateral that can be controlled and appears capable of control
in much the same way. Because of this, I argue that extending
control to virtual currency makes sense as it maintains
consistency of treatment across similar collateral types.
Furthermore, leveraging an existing part of Article 9 minimizes
potential uncertainty. Secured creditors are familiar with the
concept of control, so adapting to control over a different type of
collateral should cause minimal disruption.
C. INTEGRATING CONTROL OF VIRTUAL CURRENCY INTO ARTICLE 9

To this point, I have discussed the need to define virtual
currency as a separate collateral type and how the concept of
control could be applied to virtual currency. I now turn briefly to
how one might integrate this new collateral type and the concept
of control into Article 9. In short, my proposal can be distilled into
the following:
1.

2.

3.

296

Recognize virtual currency as a distinct
collateral type by adopting a definition for
decentralized cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin.
Identify and describe the method or methods of
establishing control over virtual currency (e.g.,
transfer of the virtual currency to a wallet
owned by the secured creditor; or establish a triparty relationship between the debtor, secured
creditor, and any third-party that maintains the
virtual currency).
Consistent with Article 9's existing provisions
on control, 296 allow for control as an alternative

See U.C.C. § 9-203(b)(3)(D).
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means of attaching a security interest in virtual
currency.
Consistent with Article 9's existing provisions
on control, 297 either make control the only way
to perfect a security interest in virtual currency
collateral, or provide for an alternative way to
perfect.
Consistent with Article 9's existing provisions
on control, 298 grant priority in competitions over
virtual currency collateral to secured creditors
that perfect via control.

Because Items 1 and 2 have been discussed above in Parts V.A
and V.B, I will spend the remainder of Part V.C focusing on Items 3,
4, and 5, specifically addressing the question of how control of
virtual currency should modify the process of attaching, perfecting,
and determining priority under Article 9. I start from the premise
developed to this point-that virtual currency is like the intangible
collateral types that are capable of control under Article 9.299 I also
acknowledge that my basic position is that the most seamless way
of integrating virtual currency is to mirror the analogous provisions
that apply to control of deposit accounts, investment property,
letter-of-credit rights, and electronic chattel paper. As a result, the
special rules that apply in these cases-along with any associated
benefits-should also apply to virtual currency collateral.
With respect to attachment, Section 9-203(b)(3)(D) currently
allows for a secured party to attach a security interest in deposit
accounts, investment property, letter-of-credit rights, and
electronic chattel paper by establishing control "pursuant to the
debtor's security agreement." 300
This creates an alternative
method of attaching a security interest. Recall that the most
common way of attaching a security interest (and the only way to
attach a security interest in a general intangible) is to obtain an

See U.C.C. §§ 9-203(b)(3)(D), 9-314.
§§ 9-327 to -329, 9-330(a)(1) (2017).
2919See U.C.C. §§ 9-104 to -107 (recognizing the possibility of control over the following
types of intangible collateral: (1) deposit accounts; (2) investment property; (3) letter-ofcredit rights; and (4) electronic chattel paper).
3O U.C.C.§ 9-203(b)(3)(I)).
297

298 See U.C.C.
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"authenticated security agreement" that describes the collateral. 30 1
Comment 4 to Section 9-203 explains that the alternative
dispenses with the requirement of authentication as the
evidentiary test and substitutes control. 30 2 Section 9-203(b)(3)(D)
also cross-references other UCC sections that set forth the
methods by which a secured party can establish control over each
30 3
of the listed collateral types.
To achieve consistency as to attachment, virtual currency
should be added to the list of collateral types in Section 9203(b)(3)(D), and a new section should be added to demonstrate
how a secured party establishes control of virtual currency. These
modifications would allow for the attachment of a security interest
in virtual currency to be achieved in the same way as similarly
situated intangible collateral: either by an authenticated security
agreement that describes the collateral or by control pursuant to
30 4
the debtor's security agreement.
Turning to perfection, Article 9 generally requires the filing of a
financing statement to perfect a security interest. 30 5 However,
Section 9-310(b) sets forth exceptions to the general rule. A
security interest in deposit accounts, investment property, letterof-credit rights, and electronic chattel paper can also be perfected
Section 9-314 essentially
by control under Section 9-314.306
provides that a secured party may perfect a security interest in
such collateral by establishing control in the manner specified for
each listed collateral type. 30 7 Section 9-312(b)(1)-(2) adds that
control is the only way to perfect a security interest in deposit
accounts and letter-of-credit rights. 30 8 Taken together, this means
that control is an additional or alternative method of perfecting a
security interest in investment property and electronic chattel

U.C.C. § 9-203(b)(3)(A).
U.C.C. § 9-203(b)(3)(A) cmt. 4.
303 See sections cited supra note 299.
304 See U.C.C. § 9-203 (describing the conditions required for a security interest to become
enforceable).
305 See U.C.C. § 9-310(a) ("[A] financing statement must be filed to perfect all security
31

302

interests ...

!).

U.C.C. § 9-310(b)(8).
307 U.C.C. § 9-314.
308 U.C.C. §§ 9-312(b)(1)-(2), 9-314.
306
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paper. However, it is the exclusive method of perfecting a security
interest in deposit accounts and letter-of-credit rights. 309
Again, to create consistency across similarly situated intangible
collateral types, Sections 9-310 and 9-314 could be amended to add
virtual currency as a collateral type capable of perfection by
control. Control could either be an alternative or the exclusive
method of perfection.
Finally, Article 9 sets forth special priority rules that only apply
to the types of intangible collateral capable of control. 310 These
rules basically give preferential treatment to secured creditors
who perfect by control. For example, Section 9-327 sets forth the
rules that govern priority among conflicting security interests in
the same deposit accounts.3 1 1 A secured creditor with control of
the deposit account has priority over any conflicting security
interest held by a secured party without control.3 1 2 Subject to
some exceptions, the priority of conflicting security interests
perfected by control generally rank in order of the time that the
secured creditor obtained control. 31 3 Because deposit accounts can
be controlled in different ways, Section 9-327 goes only to establish
the relative priority among the different methods of control.3 1 4
A new section, akin to Section 9-327, should be added to
determine the relative priority among conflicting interests in
virtual currency. The new section ought to remain consistent with
Article 9's position that a secured party who takes steps to control
collateral has a stronger claim to the collateral and any proceeds
obtaining in an Article 9 sale. For example, the new section could
provide the following: (1) a secured creditor with control of virtual
currency collateral has priority over any conflicting security
interest by a person without control; (2) priority between
conflicting security interests perfected by control rank in order of
when the secured party obtained control; and (3) a method for
U.C.C. § 9-312(b)(1)-(2).
See U.C.C. §§ 9-327 to -330.
-11 U.C.C. § 9-327; see also § 9-328 (providing rules for determining priority of conflicting
security interests in investment property); § 9-329 (providing rules for determining the
priority of conflicting security interests in the letter-of-credit rights); § 9-330 (providing rules
for determining the priority of conflicting security interest in the electronic chattel paper).
312 U.C.C. § 9-327(1).
313U.C.C. § 9-327(2).
314 See U.C.C. § 9-327(3)-(4).
309
310
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determining the relative priority between different methods of
controlling virtual currency (for example, a secured creditor that
obtains control by transfer of the virtual currency trumps a
secured creditor who obtains control via a tri-party agreement).
By adopting this proposed new section, the priority rules
governing virtual currency would effectively mirror Article 9's
treatment of similar categories of intangible collateral, and the
default priority rule in Section 9-322 would be supplemented by
new priority rules specific to virtual currency.
Because Article 9 already recognizes control over deposit
accounts, investment property, letter-of-credit rights, and electronic
chattel paper, a model exists for extending similar treatment to
virtual currency. Accordingly, it seems more appropriate for Article
9 to treat virtual currency like similarly situated collateral types
(e.g., deposit accounts and investment property) instead of
relegating it to the residual category of general intangibles.
Modifying Article 9 in this way creates greater consistency across
similar collateral types and minimizes the difficulties that secured
creditors might face when learning a new system. Ultimately, this
provides greater certainty-which is prized by secured creditors.
But this is not the only benefit. As discussed in Part V.D below,
these changes also address some of the challenges currently facing
those who resort to virtual currency as collateral.
D. ADDITIONAL BENEFITS OF AMENDING ARTICLE 9

I would like to conclude by briefly highlighting some of the ways
that adopting control of virtual currency would benefit those
engaging in secured transactions with virtual currency collateral.
Let me be clear that my proposal will not and is not intended to
remedy all risks of taking a security interest in virtual currency.
In my view, this is appropriate, because Article 9's objective is not
to eliminate risk. Rather, it perpetuates a coherent system of
rules so that those participating in secured transactions can
manage that risk. It is fair to say that risk is an inherent part of
all secured transactions. Secured creditors have always navigated
that risk and must continue to do so.
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As applied to virtual currency collateral, this means that
certain risks will remain. Volatility in the value of virtual
currency may lead to sharp declines in the value of collateral. 315
Cyberattacks and exchange closures could lead to a total loss. 316
These types of risk are not unique to virtual currency collateral.
Collateral of all types may suffer from decreased value or total
loss. The value of machinery depreciates over time. A car could be
destroyed in a fiery wreck. Jewelry can be stolen. The price of
stocks and commodities fluctuate.
Secured creditors have always managed the risk of having
insufficient collateral at the time of a default. As a practical
matter, a secured creditor is in a position to evaluate potential
debtors and determine an appropriate amount of collateral. Thus,
secured creditors may: (1) demand that the value of collateral
significantly exceed the amount of the debtor's obligation; (2)
diversify the mix of collateral; or (3) charge interest at a rate that
accounts for the risk. These same practices can be applied to
secured transactions involving virtual currency. 31 7
If eliminating these types of risk is not the objective, what is the
purpose? The short answer is to improve the effectiveness of
Article 9's process as it applies to virtual currency collateral. I
submit that my proposed modifications do this in two ways. First,
treating virtual currency as a separate type of collateral aids in
determining the scope of a security interest and facilitates notice
filing. Second, extending the concept of control provides greater
certainty in establishing rights in virtual currency collateral.
Each of these benefits is discussed in turn below.
1. Identifying Collateraland Notice Filing. At present, a person
wishing to attach a security interest in a debtor's virtual currency
must have the debtor authenticate a security agreement that
describes the collateral. 31 8 A collateral description "is sufficient,
315 See Martinson & Masterson, supra note 165 (noting that "creditors are ... concerned
with restricting Bitcoin acquisition or use by borrowers due to the... extreme volatility of
[its] value'); see also supra note 100 and accompanying text (warning of Bitcoin's wildly
fluctuating value).
316 See supranote 173 and accompanying text.
317 See, e.g., Appel, supra note 165 (noting that lenders may want additional security).
318 See U.C.C. § 9-203(b)(3) (providing that "a security interest is enforceable against the
debtor... only if... the debtor has an authenticated security agreement that describes the
collateral').
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whether or not it is specific, if it reasonably identifies what is
described."3 19 Reasonable identification can be provided by, for
example, specific listing, category, a type of collateral defined in
other method so
Article 9, quantity, computational formula, or any
320
long as the collateral is objectively determinable.
Of these options, a description using a collateral type defined in
Article 9 appears to provide secured parties with the greatest
certainty. Because Article 9 defines "general intangibles" as a
collateral type, and virtual currency appears to fall within that
definition, a security agreement that describes the collateral as the
debtor's general intangibles satisfies the requirements regarding a
321
sufficient description.
In contrast, a description via specific listing poses some
At a minimum, a specific listing would
practical problems.
ostensibly require that the security agreement list each of the
debtor's Bitcoin addresses for receiving virtual currency (e.g., the
debtor's public keys) and possibly the associated private key that
allows the debtor to access the virtual currency. Because this
would compromise security and privacy, a specific listing may be
impracticable from the debtor's perspective. Moreover, such a
description may prove too limited for a secured party because it
may not capture Bitcoins transferred to the debtor at subsequently
generated Bitcoin addresses. As such, describing virtual currency
via a specific listing may be a practical impossibility.
As an alternative, a secured party could attempt to describe
virtual currency collateral more broadly. For example, "all of the
debtor's virtual currency" or "500 Bitcoins that debtor maintains
with [third-party wallet provider like Coinbase or Circle]." The
former description is arguably sufficient as a description by
category, 322 and the latter description is arguably sufficient as a

319

U.C.C. § 9-108(a).

320

U.C.C.

§ 9-108(b)(1)-(b).

See U.C.C. § 9-108(b)(3). Article 9 generally provides that a description using a type of
collateral defined by Article 9 is sufficient. Nevertheless, the collateral types specified in
Section 9-108(e) are excluded from this general rule, and a description using any of these
defined collateral types is insufficient. General intangibles are not among the defined
collateral types in Section 9-108(b)(3), so a description of collateral as general intangibles
would be sufficient.
322 See U.C.C. § 9-108(b)(2) (allowing for a description by category as a reasonable
identification of collateral).
321
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method (using both quantity and category) that makes the
collateral objectively determinable. 323
Once the security interest is attached, perfection of a security
interest in virtual currency requires filing a financing statement
with the applicable state UCC filing office. 324 The financing
statement must describe the collateral, but less specificity is
required.
Unlike the collateral description in a security
agreement, a financing statement is sufficient if it simply
"indicates the collateral."3 25 A description that satisfies the
requirements for a security agreement is sufficient.3 26 A generic
description like "all assets" or "all personal property" is also
acceptable.
The justification for this is that the financing
statement is intended primarily to provide notice that a security
interest may exist. 327 This notice filing system means that a
person searching the records to identify a prior security interest
must investigate further to determine the existence and scope of
the security interest. 328 This may involve contacting the debtor
and the listed secured party, and reviewing the applicable security
agreement.
This lack of specificity required in both the security agreement
and the financing statement may create confusion among debtors,
secured parties, and subsequent creditors as to the scope of a
security interest. An unsophisticated party may not understand
that the term "general intangible" includes virtual currency. This
concern is further exacerbated because "general intangibles" exist
as a broadly defined residual category of collateral, and the most
commonly recognized "general intangibles" differ in many respects
29
from virtual currency.3

See U.C.C. § 9-108(b)(6).
See U.C.C. § 9-310(a); see also supra Part IV.C (discussing the process of reflecting a
security interest under Article 9).
325 U.C.C. § 9-502(a)(3).
326 U.C.C. § 9-502 cmt. 2 ("What is required to be filed is not ... the security agreement
itself, but only a simple record providing a limited amount of information (financing
statement).").
327 See id. ('The notice itself indicates merely that a person may have a security interest
in the collateral indicated.').
328 See id.
329 See supra Part IV (explaining why virtual currency fails to fit neatly within most
intangible collateral types identified in Article 9).
323
324
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A debtor, therefore, may not understand that granting a security
interest in "general intangibles" gives the secured party the right to
foreclose upon the debtor's virtual currency in the event of a default.
This may lead to conflict between the debtor and the secured party.
Moreover, the debtor may unknowingly represent to a subsequent
creditor that the debtor's virtual currency is unencumbered, which
may lead to conflicting security interests.
A person searching the UCC filing system may run into similar
problems. The failure to recognize that a financing statement
collateral description of "general intangibles" encompasses virtual
currency may result in unwittingly taking a subordinate position
or having insufficient collateral. The same is true if the person
searching the UCC filing system investigates further after finding
an "all assets" financing statement and does not understand the
scope of the term "general intangibles" in a security agreement.
In the end, the lack of specificity in collateral descriptions
impedes the ability of those engaging in secured transactions to
communicate effectively and efficiently. Adding virtual currency
as a defined collateral type may improve some of these issues by
increasing the likelihood that both security agreements and
financing statements will contain more specific descriptions of
virtual currency. 330 The use of more specific descriptions would
improve the ability to give and obtain notice of a security interest
in virtual currency. That is to say, it might improve transparency
and awareness among all of the parties involved.
2. EstablishingRights to Collateral. One of the core functions
of Article 9 is to provide a process for obtaining an interest in
personal property collateral that is enforceable upon a default.
Extending control to virtual currency improves this process by
providing definitive means of establishing one's rights in the case
of conflicting security interests over the virtual currency.
Conflicting security interests are one of the most significant
threats to a secured creditor's rights to collateral. This is because

330 By removing virtual currency from the definition of "general intangibles," a secured
party could no longer attach a security interest in a debtor's Bitcoin via an authenticated
security agreement that describes the collateral as a general intangible. Instead, a security
agreement that describes a debtor's Bitcoin by collateral type would be sufficient only if it
used the new defined term for virtual currency. See U.C.C. § 9-108 (explaining the
sufficiency required in adequately describing property).
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the secured creditor with priority has the right to payment in full
before any proceeds from the sale of collateral (if any remain) are
distributed to those with lower priority. 331
So, as between
conflicting security interests, priority can mean the difference
between getting paid or not. It follows, then, that existing but
unknown security interests pose a real threat because they may
result in a secured creditor unknowingly taking a junior position.
Since Article 9 currently treats virtual currency as a general
intangible, the first secured creditor to file a financing statement
or perfect will have priority. 33 2 Under this construct, a proper
search of the UCC filing office records should, in most cases,
uncover any prior security interest in virtual currency granted by
a potential debtor. Because Article 9 utilizes a "notice filing'
system, it is then up to the searcher to investigate any financing
statements that cover virtual currency. 333 Even so, mistakes can
occur-especially if, as discussed above, the virtual currency is not
described with specificity.
Even if an error is not made, security interests that are not
reflected in the filing office records may have priority. The virtual
currency may be subject to a security interest granted by another
person if the potential debtor acquired it subject to a security
interest that continues to be effective. 334 Finally, a prior security
interest may cover the virtual currency not as original collateral,
but rather as "proceeds" (e.g., a filed financing statement discloses
a security interest that only covers the debtor's equipment, but the
debtor trades some of the equipment for virtual currency).3 35
Consequently, the existing process imposes a significant
investigative burden.
Minimizing the risk of prior security
interest requires comprehensive inquiries into subjects such as
how the virtual currency was acquired.

331 See U.C.C. §§ 9-609 cmt. 5, 9-610 cmt. 5, 9-615(a) (describing the rights of senior secured
parties).
332 See U.C.C. §§ 9-203, 9-322 (providing rules for priority based on the time of filing or
perfection).
:3 See U.C.C. § 9-502 cmt. 2 ("Further inquiring from the parties concerned will be
necessary to disclose the complete state of affairs.').
33 See U.C.C. §§ 9-201(a), 9-315(a)(1), 9-317(b), 9-320(a)-9-323(b) (explaining the process
by which a security interest may be granted by a person other than the debtor).
335 U.C.C. §§ 9-102(a)(64), 9-315(a).
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I argue that extending the concept of control to virtual currency
results in a more effective and efficient process for obtaining
enforceable rights in virtual currency collateral. Control gives
secured creditors a clear and unambiguous way to bypass the
Control simplifies the
uncertainties of determining priority.
process. If the secured creditor perfects by establishing control of
virtual currency, it has priority over those that perfect by another
method. 336 There is no need to worry about conflicting security
interests perfected via another method.
The process is also streamlined when more than one secured
creditor perfects by control because the acceptable methods of
establishing control are limited by Article 9.337 Those who wish to
establish priority over virtual collateral simply need to: (1) request
that the virtual currency be transferred to them; and (2) determine
whether the third party that maintains the debtor's virtual
currency has executed a control agreement with the debtor and
any other person. Taking these steps will almost assuredly
provide enough information to determine whether another person
has control of the debtor's virtual currency, which obviates the
need for more comprehensive investigations.
One final point is worth mentioning. Modifying Article 9 in this
way also results in an appropriate allocation of risk. The prospect
of added certainty will incentivize secured creditors to seek
control. Those who take the steps required by Article 9 will enjoy
the benefit of informed decision-making and the greater
assurances of priority. In contrast, those who elect not to seek
control rightfully bear the added risk of uncertainty as to their
status and rights to collateral upon default.
VI. CONCLUSION

By making strides towards the establishment of laws and
regulations specific to virtual currency, the United States has
signaled its intent to accommodate the growth of virtual currency,
so long as legitimate concerns are appropriately addressed. To
336 See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 9-327 to -329 (establishing priority for secured parties who have
control of the deposit account, investment property, and letter-of-credit rights, respectively).
337 See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 9-104 to -107 (explaining the acceptable methods of establishing
control).
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date, the scope of efforts to develop the law applicable to virtual
currency has been relatively narrow. I stress the importance of
these efforts but contend that it is equally important to start
expanding the conversation. New uses and applications of virtual
currency are poised to impact disparate areas of law. I highlight
one example-the use of virtual currency as collateral under
Article 9 of the UCC-to accentuate a larger point. If the United
States is indeed committed to regulating virtual currency, it is
time to start thinking more broadly. A regulatory scheme cannot
remain silent as virtual currency use continues to evolve. This
requires ongoing efforts to understand how virtual currency is
used and what challenges this presents for existing legal
frameworks. Only then can policymakers and the legal community
have meaningful deliberations about the suitability of existing law
and the need for modifications or creation of new law specific to
virtual currency.
In the end, this is an essential part of
establishing a comprehensive and appropriately-scaled set of laws
and regulations for virtual currency.
I also make a more substantive contribution. I show that the
existing provisions of Article 9 can accommodate the practice of
using virtual currency as collateral. Although the process is
arguably suboptimal in several respects, it is possible to carry on by
treating virtual currency as a general intangible. But there are
limitations to this approach. Those currently dealing with virtual
currency collateral would be wise to supplement this process with
additional protections, including increased collateral and
restrictions on a debtor's ability to access or transfer virtual
currency.
Although the difficulties of enacting a uniform amendment
should not be understated, Article 9 is capable of being optimized
for virtual currency collateral with relatively minor modificationrecognizing virtual currency as a distinct collateral type and
extending control to virtual currency.
These changes are
consistent with Article 9 and build upon a familiar practice in
secured transactions. As such, this framework addresses the need
for a process that is tailored to virtual currency, while minimizing
some of the costs of implementing a change.
Time will tell whether virtual currency has lasting relevance.
As such, amending Article 9 may not be appropriate at this
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juncture. In fact, it may never make sense to modify Article 9 for
Nevertheless, virtual currency is
virtual currency collateral.
It is disrupting traditional
affecting the world right now.
including secured
frameworks,
legal
industries and existing
about
conversation
transactions. So now is the time to expand the
the developing legal and regulatory regime applicable to virtual
currency, including its broader commercial law implications.
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